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Abstract 
Despite some progress, there is still evidence of discrimination on the grounds of gender and ethnic or 
racial origins in OECD labour markets. Field experiments show pervasive ethnic discrimination in 
many  countries.  We  show  indirect  cross-country/time-series  evidence  that,  using  product  market 
regulation as an instrument, suggests that on average at least 8% of the gender employment gap and a 
larger proportion of the gender wage gap can be attributed to discrimination.  
Virtually all OECD countries have enacted anti-discrimination laws in recent decades, and evaluations 
as well as cross-country analysis suggest that, if well-designed, these laws can be effective in reducing 
disparities  in  labour  market  outcomes.  However,  enforcement  of  anti-discrimination  legislation  is 
essentially based on victims’ willingness to claim their rights. Thus, public awareness of legal rules 
and their expected consequences (notably, victims’ costs and benefits of lodging complaints) is a 
crucial element of an effective policy strategy to establish a culture of equal treatment. However, legal 
rules are likely to have more impact if the enforcement is not exclusively dependent on individuals. In 











































Employment outcomes are far from being evenly distributed among the various socio-demographic 
groups. Although women’s rising labour market participation has been a major component in labour supply 
growth during past decades, their labour market performance still remains significantly worse than that of 
men, sometimes dramatically so: in certain countries female employment rates and wages are more than 
25% lower than those of their male counterparts, even controlling for observable characteristics. Likewise, 
ethnic minorities appear to fare less well in OECD labour markets than workers belonging to majority 
groups (OECD, 2007a). Empirical evidence indicates that, in addition to factors determining labour supply 
patterns, discrimination in the labour market – i.e. the unequal treatment of equally productive individuals 
only because they belong to a specific group – might be one of the forces behind these large and persistent 
disparities.  In  a  similar  vein,  recent  OECD work  on  older  workers  and disabled  persons  stresses  that 
changing  negative  employer  attitudes  is  key  to  foster  the  employment  prospects  of  these  two under-
represented  groups  and  review  the  potential  role  of  national  anti-discrimination  laws  in  this  respect 
(OECD, 2006a, 2006b and 2007b). 
Virtually  all  OECD  countries  have  enacted  anti-discrimination  laws  over  recent  decades.  This 
important legislative effort has been primarily justified on the grounds of equity and social cohesion. This 
notwithstanding, to date, no comparable inventory of anti-discrimination legislation on gender and ethnic 
grounds  has  ever  been  produced  and  no  assessment  of  these  laws,  in  terms  of  their  labour  market 
implications, has been undertaken for the OECD countries as a whole. The present chapter is a first attempt 
to fill this gap. 
In many OECD countries that are facing rapid population ageing, increasing the employment rates of 
under-represented groups is one key to offsetting labour shortages. Women still constitute the largest pool 
of  underutilised  labour  supply.  In  addition,  it  is  expected  that  there  will  be  need  for  more  worker 
immigration in the near future. This will only be possible if past and current immigrants, who are more 
numerous, are seen to be integrating in the host country (OECD, 2007c). Policy efforts of OECD countries 
to facilitate access to employment and increase the return to paid jobs for women and ethnic minorities, as 
well as other  under-represented groups,  are  sizeable,  and typically  take forms  such  as specific  labour 
market  programmes,  family-friendly  policies  or  tax  incentives.  However,  pervasive  discrimination 
potentially impairs the effectiveness of such policies. Hence, it is important to quantify the extent of such 
discrimination if one wishes to put in place effective policies to minimise it. 
The chapter starts by providing a picture of employment and wage disparities by gender and ethnic 
groups (Section 1). Part of these disparities is explained by easily identifiable factors, such as differences 
in educational attainment. There are a variety of potential explanations for the remaining part, including 
unobservable individual characteristics that affect productivity – e.g. socio-cultural differences in attitude 
towards work – and of course, discrimination. Section 2 explicitly focuses on the issue of discrimination. It 
presents  various pieces  of  evidence  on  the  extent  of  discrimination, relying on both  a  comprehensive 
review of the empirical literature on gender and racial discrimination in the labour market and new cross-
country empirical analysis on the contribution of discrimination to gender employment and wage gaps. 
Finally, Section 3 documents and analyses the legal and institutional framework that OECD countries have 
gradually implemented to fight gender and racial discrimination in the labour market. It also provides some 
evidence that such policy efforts may have contributed to improve the labour market situation of women 












































•  Across the OECD countries, 20% fewer women than men have a job, on average, and they are 
paid  17%  less  than  their  men  counterparts.  Similar  gaps  are  found  when  comparing  ethnic 
minorities with their majority counterparts, although the average gap is more difficult to quantify 
because race-based statistics are illegal in many countries. Observable characteristics, such as 
education, experience, occupation, and, when available, motivation, expectations, and field of 
study, account for a large share of these gaps. Yet, they leave at least one fourth of gender and 
ethnic gaps unexplained. 
•  Gender and  ethnic disparities in employment and wages  have  narrowed  over  time in  OECD 
countries, although the pace of their contraction has slowed over time. As regards gender gaps, 
the  educational  catch-up  of  women  is  by  far  the  most  important  factor  responsible  for  the 
narrowing of the gap. Yet, its potential to reduce the gender gaps further appears to be largely 
exhausted in many countries. 
•  Field experiments show pervasive discrimination on the ground of ethnic origin in all countries 
where they are available. Moreover, indirect evidence shows that discrimination also plays a role 
in shaping gender disparities. Empirical estimates suggest that on average at least 10% of the 
narrowing of the gender employment gap in the past thirty years can be attributed to a reduction 
of the extent of discrimination. 
•  Pro-competitive  product  market  deregulation,  by  limiting  entry,  survival  and  growth  of 
discriminating firms, can play a significant role in reducing the extent of discrimination in the 
labour market. Estimates suggest that if all OECD countries liberalised their product market to 
the level of the country with the most pro-competitive regulatory  stance, the average  gender 
employment  and  wage  gaps  would  fall  by  at  least  1  and  3 percentage  points,  respectively. 
However, regulatory reforms are unlikely to eliminate all employers who operate discriminatory 
practices from the market and other policy interventions are necessary. 
•  Almost all OECD countries have established laws to combat discrimination on both gender and 
ethnic grounds. Nonetheless, enforcement of these regulations is essentially based on victims’ 
willingness to claim their rights. As a consequence, public awareness and incentives for victims 
to  lodge  complaints  are  crucial  elements  of  an  effective  anti-discrimination  policy  strategy. 
Moreover, legal rules, if well-known, may be an important vehicle of cultural change. Yet, in 
countries where such information is available, there is evidence that many people are not aware 
of their legal rights as regards discrimination in the workplace. 
•  Individual victims of discrimination still face strong barriers to bring a case before the courts: 
legal  action  remains  a  costly,  complex,  time-consuming  and  adversarial  process  in  many 
countries. Alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution, such as formal mediation, are available 
in most countries under review. And in countries that have a long experience of such procedures, 
they have been shown to be effective in solving discrimination disputes. This notwithstanding, 
mediation will always work better against the background threat of litigation. 
•  Legal rules will have more impact if the enforcement is not exclusively dependent on individuals 
deprived of their rights. In most countries, there are specialised bodies empowered to investigate 
companies and organisations, and to take, even in the absence of individual complaints, legal 
actions  against  employers  who  operate  discriminatory  practices.  The  extent  to  which  such 
measures are effectively implemented is rather unclear. For instance, in many countries, these 










































•  Empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  anti-discrimination  legislation  is  scarce.  Available 
evaluations, mainly focusing on the United States, as well as cross-country analysis, suggest that 
these laws  may  reduce  gender and  ethnic  disparities  in labour  market  outcomes. But  further 
research is needed.  In  particular,  the magnitude  of  these positive effects  remains difficult to 
establish.  Moreover,  if  not  carefully  designed,  anti-discrimination  laws  may  discourage 
employers from hiring disadvantaged groups in the first place. Legislation is only one possible 
tool  to  combat  discrimination,  and  its  interaction  with  other  policy  instruments  to  promote 
equality and diversity, such as positive and affirmative action, would also deserve an in-depth 
analysis. 
1.  Some stylized facts: gender and ethnic gaps in labour market performance 
In most OECD countries, differences in labour market performance by gender and ethnic origin have 
been persistent over time, although the magnitude, nature and trend of these gaps vary across countries and 
have changed over time. A variety of economic, social or cultural factors can potentially explain these 
differences. Some of them, such as educational attainment, are easy to identify, while the role of some 
other factors is more difficult to assert, not least because they are not directly observable. Discrimination is 
part of this second category of latent sources of gender and ethnic disparities. This section presents the 
evolution of employment and wage gaps by gender and ethnic origin and assess how much of these gaps 
can be explained by changes in observable factors. What is left could be taken as a crude upper limit to the 
extent of discrimination in OECD labour markets. 
1.1.  Gender disparities in the labour market 
The gender employment gap has narrowed over time in the OECD area …  
One of the most profound labour market developments in OECD countries over the post-war period 
has been the continued progress made by women (see e.g. OECD, 2002, Chapter 2). Female participation 
and  employment  have  expanded  considerably  and  the  employment  gap  relative  to  men  has  narrowed 
virtually everywhere, although the pace of convergence differs significantly across countries (Figure 3.1, 
Panel A). In countries such as Spain, Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands, the gender employment 
gap – defined as the difference between male and female employment rates as a percentage of the male 
employment rate – has narrowed by 1.5 percentage points or more per year in the last ten years, while 
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Figure 3.1. The gender employment gap has narrowed over time 
and converge towards countries with low gaps 
Panel A. Average annual change in employment rate gap,
prime-age workers 
Panel B. Employment gaps in 1995 and 
average annual change, 1995-2005
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Note: The gender employment gap is defined as the difference between male and female employment rates as a percentage of the 
male employment rate. 
Source: OECD database on Labour Force Statistics. 
… but the speed of contraction has substantially slowed down in most countries … 
In many countries, the shrinking of the gender gap in employment has somewhat slowed down in the 
past ten years. By restricting the comparison to only those countries for which data are available for earlier 
years, it appears that the narrowing of the gap was on average about 0.2 percentage points per year faster 
between 1985 and 1995 than between 1995 and 2005. This pattern, however, can essentially be explained 
by  the  fact  that  as  laggard  countries  catch-up,  their  potential  for  further  improvements  is  reduced. 
Similarly, cross-country differences in the reduction of the gap are by and large explained by the level of 
the gap at the beginning of the period (Figure 3.1, Panel B).
1 
These developments mostly reflect changes in the labour supply behaviour of women, a growing 
proportion of whom remain in the labour market throughout their working lives and combine paid work 
                                                       
1.  The correlation coefficient between the average annual change and the initial level of the gap is -0.65 for 
the change between 1985 and 1995 and -0.53 for the change between 1995 and 2005. The latter figure, 
however, increases to -0.86 if Mexico and Turkey, two clear outliers in Figure 3.1, are excluded. Moreover 
the countries where convergence slowed between the two decades are those with the smallest employment 











































with caring of children and elderly relatives (see e.g. OECD, 2002; and Altonji and Blank, 1999). A variety 
of forces have driven the dynamics of female labour supply, including changes in family patterns and 
household formation that increasingly rely also on women’s earnings in household income; increasing 
aspirations of women for the independence and fulfilment that paid employment can bring; and increasing 
policy efforts by governments aimed at raising female employment rates by providing tax incentives and 
suitable framework for family-friendly work environments (OECD, 2007d). At the same time, the dramatic 
increase in the average educational attainment of women that has been experienced by all OECD countries 
is by far the most important explanatory driver. For example, Bassanini and Duval (2006) find that, in their 
sample  of  20 OECD  countries,  about  50%  of  the  cross-country  variation  in  the  growth  of  female 
employment rates between 1982 and 2003 can be attributed to raising educational attainment, while only 
28% was due to policies and institutions. 
… and gender disparities remain large 
In 2005, the employment rate of prime-age women was 10% to 20% smaller than that of their male 
counterpart in most OECD countries (Figure 3.2). Smaller gaps are found only in the Nordic countries, 
with Finland being the country with the smallest gap (6%). The gender employment gap is highest in 
Turkey, Mexico, Greece, Korea and Italy. With a gap well above 30%, these countries still lag dramatically 
behind the OECD average (20.6%). 
It is possible to appraise the importance of educational attainment patterns in cross-section data (that 
are  available  for  all  OECD  countries)  by  comparing  employment  gaps  across  countries  for  similar 
distributions of educational attainment in the population. Employment rates are generally much higher, and 
the gender gap lower, among women with a tertiary qualification than among low-educated women (see 
OECD,  2007e,  statistical  annex).  In  fact,  higher  education  is  likely  to  give  women  access  to  more 
interesting  and well-paid  occupations,  making  paid  employment  more  attractive  and  formal  child-care 
arrangements  more  affordable  (see  e.g.  Altonji  and  Blank,  1999).  Figure 3.2  shows  hypothetical 
employment gaps that would result in each country if gender employment gaps by educational attainment 
remained unchanged, but the distribution of the population by gender and education were the same as in 
Finland, which is the country with the lowest overall gap. To the extent that Finland appears to be one of 
the  countries  in  which  educational  attainment  is  the  highest  and  where  women  have  the  greatest 
educational  lead  with  respect  to  men,  the  comparison  of  actual  and  hypothetical  gaps  gives  a  rough 
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Figure 3.2. The gender employment gap still varies widely across OECD countries 











Employment rate gap Employment rate gap assuming that the population share by educational attainment is identical to that in Finland
 
Note: The gender employment gap is defined as the difference between male and female employment rates as a percentage of the 
male employment rate. 
a) Data refer to 2003 for Japan. 
Source: OECD database on Labour Force Statistics; OECD (2007g). 
On  average,  the  employment  gap  would  be  20%  (5 percentage  points)  lower  if,  with  unchanged 
employment differentials by education, the distribution of the population by educational attainment were 
the same as in Finland. Not surprisingly, however, this improvement is concentrated in countries that are 
far from gender parity. Countries with low gender employment gaps appear to have already attained higher 
average educational attainment among women compared with their male peers. Combining this evidence 
with the fact that no or little further narrowing of the gender gap has occurred in these countries in the past 
ten years, one can cautiously argue that it is unlikely that major improvements in the gender gap can be 
reached  in  these  countries  through  further  improvement  in  human  capital  among  women,  and  that 
accumulation of human capital alone can hardly reduce the gap below a floor of about 5%.
2 
The wage gap between men and women persists … 
In order to assess the relative importance of forces that drive gender employment disparities, however, 
it is important to look simultaneously at the wage gap (Bovenberg, 2007). In 2001, the latest year for 
which comparable data for a large number of OECD countries are available, women earned, on average, 
17% less than men per hour worked, with however marked differences across countries (Figure 3.3). The 
gender wage gap also appears somewhat negatively related to the gender employment gap, as one would 
                                                       
2.  Labour demand factors have also played a role in shaping gender employment gaps, and they might play an 
increasing role in the future to the extent that the labour supply push, due to the evolution of educational 
attainment  in  the  population,  might  slow  substantially.  For  instance,  the  industry  structure  of  labour 
demand has changed in a way that has favoured women, with a shift from agriculture and manufacturing 
towards services, where women tend to be over-represented (see e.g. OECD, 2002). In addition, upward 
shifts in aggregate labour demand (e.g. as a result of liberalisation reforms in the product and service 
markets and/or policy reforms aimed at reducing insider/outsider segmentation in the labour market) are 










































expect if labour supply patterns determined gender employment gaps and labour demand were the same for 
women and men (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2006).
3 Yet, a few countries (the Nordic countries, Korea and a 
number  of  southern  European  countries)  cluster  away  from  the  virtual  negatively-sloped  line  linking 
employment and wage gaps. Moreover, a closer look at gender gaps by educational attainment suggests 
that the relationship between gender employment and wage gaps is weak, suggesting that other factors also 
play a role (Annex 3.B). 
Figure 3.3 Gender wage and employment gaps are weakly correlated 
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Note: The gender employment gap is defined as the difference between male and female employment rates as a percentage of the 
male employment rate. The gender wage gap is defined as the difference between average male and female hourly wages as a 
percentage of the average male wage. Data refer to 2000 for Sweden and to 2002 for the United States. 
Source: See Annex 3.A1. 
… and a large part of it is not explained by easily observable characteristics 
Regression-based decompositions have been used in the literature to try to identify the sources of 
wage  gaps  between  men  and  women.  These decompositions  allow assessing  how much  of  the  gap is 
explained by observed gender differences in terms of individual productive characteristics, the remaining 
unexplained  portion  being  ascribed  to differences  in  unobserved  characteristics  and/or  asymmetries  in 
labour demand (see Annex 3.B). Educational attainment and labour market experience typically explains 
only a small or even negligible portion of the gender wage gap. By contrast, labour market segmentation 
by occupation, type of contract, industry as well as firms and establishments typically explain a far larger 
share (see e.g. Altonji and Blank, 1999; Reilly and Wirjanto, 1999; Datta Gupta and Rothstein, 2005; 
Heinze  and  Wolf,  2006).
4  However,  evidence  based  on  large-scale  matched  employer-employee  data 
                                                       
3.  Within this view, in countries with higher female labour force participation, even women with relatively 
low return to paid job would participate in the labour market and have a job, which would widen the 
average wage gap in these countries. Conversely, the women with similar potential returns would choose to 
stay out of the market in countries with low participation, thus narrowing the gap. 
4.  In particular, persisting occupational gender segmentation appears to play a key role in explaining the 
gender pay gap. Women are still under-represented in managerial and top administrative occupations as 
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shows that even taking into account a fine disaggregation of occupations, industries and establishments, 
more than 50% of the wage gap remains unexplained (e.g. Bayard et al., 2003). More important, the gender 
distribution of jobs is itself the outcome of the equilibrium in the labour market. It provides therefore some 
indication of the channels through which a gender wage gap arises, but sheds no light on the ultimate 
causes of the gap. 
A generalised contraction of the gender wage gap in the past thirty years is reported in the literature 
(see e.g. OECD, 2002).
5 For instance, in the United States the average gender wage gap declined from over 
45% in 1979 to about 30% in the 1990s, and similar figures can be found for other countries (see Altonji 
and Blank, 1999). In their meta-analysis of the gender wage gap covering a large number of OECD and 
non-OECD countries, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) show a substantial contraction of the 
total wage gap between the 1960s and 1990s. A replication analysis undertaken for the purpose of this 
chapter  on  the  same  data,  but  limiting  the  sample  to  OECD  countries,  shows  a  similar  pattern.  This 
reduction  appears  to  be  mostly  due  to  the  evolution  of  observable  characteristics  such  as  educational 
attainment and changes in labour market experience. As a result, however, the unexplained share of the gap 
has increased over time. In addition, comparable evidence from household surveys for 15 OECD countries 
provides little evidence of further narrowing of the gender wage gap between 1994 and 2001 (Annex 3.B).
6 
As in the case of the gender employment gap, these pieces of evidence could again reflect the end of the 
historical catch-up of women with respect to men in terms of educational attainment. 
Several  researchers  have  suggested  that  gender  differences  in  individual  characteristics  that  are 
usually not available in standard datasets can account for the large unexplained portion of the gender wage 
gap typically found in regression-based decompositions, as well as for the large contribution to the gender 
wage gap stemming from gender segmentation in the labour market. These include factors affecting gender 
differences in the quality of the labour supply such as the quality of education and field of study, as well as 
personal traits including expectations and motivation.
7 For example, using recent UK data on a cohort of 
graduates, Chevalier (2007) shows that differences in motivations, expectations and field of study can 
explain up to 70% of the observed wage gap. 
Although these factors can be seen essentially as labour supply determinants, the gender wage gap is 
also likely to be affected by the way the labour market rewards them. For instance, Blau and Kahn (1996, 
2000,  2003)  show  – albeit  under  somewhat  extreme  assumptions  (see  Annex  3.B) –  that  institutions 
shaping the dispersion of the returns to unobserved productive skills, and more generally of the wage 
distribution, have an important impact on the gender wage gap. However, the importance of the wage 
distribution in explaining the gap must not be overstated. For instance, while there is a strong cross-country 
correlation between wage dispersion and the gender wage gap (see Bettio, 2002; and Blau and Kahn, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
occupations and sales jobs where average wages tend to be lower (see e.g. Groshen, 1991; and OECD, 
2002). Segmentation by industry and type of firm or establishment appears also to play a key role. 
5.  Comparable evidence,  however, is usually based  on weekly, monthly  or annual earnings (e.g. OECD, 
2002) and might therefore also reflect greater work attachment by women. 
6.  National surveys for EU countries confirm this pattern, with however marked differences between recent 
and older members, the former, mainly countries of eastern Europe, still showing a significant downward 
trend (European Commission, 2007a). 
7.  Personal  traits  such  as  leadership,  motivation,  self-esteem  and  aggressivity  are  typically  found  to  be 
correlated with wages (see e.g. Bowles et al., 2001). Motivations and expectations differ significantly by 
gender.  For  instance,  Chevalier  (2007)  reports  that  men  are  more  likely  to  self-define  themselves  as 
ambitious, state that career development and financial rewards are very important long-term values and 
expect their partner to take a career break after child-birth, while women put forward job satisfaction, being 










































2003),  this appears  to be  essentially  due to  few  countries with  wage  dispersions  far  from  the  OECD 
average (Annex 3.B).
  
1.2.  Employment and wage gaps of ethnic minorities 
Racial gaps in employment and wages appear large in countries where data are available … 
The analysis of labour market inequalities by ethnic origin is more difficult due to the fact that explicit 
collection of data on race is illegal in many OECD countries, which restrains enormously the number of 
countries  for  which  racial  disparities  can  be  observed  and  racial  gaps  computed.  Figure 3.4  presents 
comparative  evidence  on  racial  employment  and  wage  gaps  in  three  countries  (Canada,  the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) where these data are available. Even though racial employment 
gaps  appear  to  be  substantial,  educational  attainment  plays  a  role  in  explaining  their  cross-country 
differences. By contrast, this does not seem to be the case as regards the racial wage gap. However, this 
might  be  simply  due  to  the  limited  information  on  educational  attainment  used  in  the  international 
comparison. In fact, available US evidence suggests that, controlling for measures of actual competences 
and areas of residence it is possible to explain up to almost three-quarters of the racial wage gap (see e.g. 
Altonji and Blank, 1999).
8 It is not clear, however, whether this result generalises to other countries. 
Figure 3.4. Differences in educational attainment play a role in shaping racial employment and wage gaps 
Employment and wage gaps between "white" and "non-white" groups in Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, prime-age workers in the private sector, 2004-2005, in percentage 








Canada United Kingdom (a) United States








Canada United Kingdom (a) United States
% Observed Assuming identical educational attainment
 
Note: The employment gap is defined as the difference between white and non-white employment rates as a percentage of the white 
employment  rate.  The  wage  gap  is  defined  here  as  the  difference  between  median  white  and  non-white  hourly  wages  as  a 
percentage of the median white wage. Data refer to 2004 for Canada, and 2005 for the United Kingdom and the United States. 
a) Education level is not available for the foreign-born population. Hence, this group has been excluded from calculations of gaps 
adjusted by educational attainment. 
Source: Canada: CNEF; United Kingdom: Labour Force Survey, September-November 2005; United States: CPS. 
In many countries, however, ethnic diversity is essentially due to migration flows. One can obtain 
some rough information on disparities by ethnic origin by looking at employment rates of the second 
                                                       
8.  Residential segregation might result from housing discrimination with cumulative effects on labour market 
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generation – i.e. the native-born with foreign-born parents. When looking at figures based on the second 
generation, however, one has to keep in mind that a number of countries are multi-ethnic and multi-racial 
societies  in  which  minority  groups  are  not  concentrated  in  the  population  with  recent  immigration 
background.  In  addition,  in  many  countries,  a  large  fraction  of  immigrants  come  from  other  OECD 
countries with similar ethnic composition of the population (OECD, 2008b). In fact, Heath et al. (2007) 
show that, in traditional immigration countries for which data are available, ethnic or racial minorities with 
no immigration background tend to fare worse in the labour market than the second generation, even 
controlling for differences in educational attainment. This notwithstanding, with the exception of Canada, 
employment rates of the second generation appear well below employment rates of native-born with no 
recent immigration  background (Figure 3.5).
9 In  countries  such  as Denmark,  Norway  and Sweden the 
employment rate of the second generation is more than 15% smaller than their native-born counterparts 
with no immigration background. 
Figure 3.5. The second generation has a lower employment rate than the native-born without a migration 
background, but its lower educational attainment explains about one half of the employment gap 
Employment gaps between the second generation and native-born with no migration background, persons aged 20 






















Note: The second generation is defined as native-born, with two parents foreign-born except for Switzerland, native-born with foreign 
nationality  at  birth,  and  the  United Kingdom,  native-born  with  “ethnic  background  other  than  white  British”.  Native-born  with  no 
migration  background  have  two  parents  native-born  except  for  Denmark,  at  least  one  parent  native-born,  Switzerland,  Swiss 
nationality at birth, and the United Kingdom,  white British ethnic background. The employment gap is defined as  the difference 
between the native-born and second-generation employment rates as a percentage of the native-born employment rate. 
Source: OECD (2007a). 
… but disparities in educational attainment are part of the story 
In most countries, however, the average educational attainment of the second generation is lower than 
that  of  the native-born  population  without a migration  background.  This  is  not  surprising, taking  into 
account that much of the post-war labour migration to European OECD countries was low qualified, and 
empirical evidence suggests that educational attainment, and more generally human capital, is transmitted 
across generations.
10 Figure 3.5 shows employment gaps between the second generation and the native-
born population without a migration background that would result in each country if employment gaps by 
educational  attainment  remained  unchanged,  but  the  distribution  of  the  population  by  educational 
                                                       
9.  Since immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon in a number of countries, comparison is restricted to 
young adults aged 20-29. 










































attainment were the same in the two groups. With unchanged gaps by educational attainment, it appears 
that the employment lag of the second generation would be reduced by about one half if it caught-up 
completely with the native-born population in terms of educational attainment. 
To  sum  up,  this  subsection  presented  evidence  suggesting  that  several  factors  other  than 
discrimination help accounting for part of the observed gender and ethnic gaps in employment and wages. 
However, labour market discrimination may also play a role: 
•  First, while the accumulation of human capital and the educational catch-up of women explain 
most of the narrowing of the gender employment gap in the post-war period, the educational push 
appears to be nearly exhausted in many countries, leaving the gender employment gap above a 
floor of 5% to 10%. 
•  Second,  even in the most  detailed  analyses  that include  the influence of usually  unobserved 
characteristics  such  as  personal  traits,  expectations  and  motivation –  observable  exogenous 
explanatory factors typically leave unexplained at least one quarter of gender or ethnic gaps. 
Moreover, it is not obvious that observable factors that are typically assumed as exogenous – such as 
motivation and expectations – are determined independently from labour market equilibrium. For example, 
if discriminatory practices or other factors lower women’s wages relative to men’s, they are likely to 
influence the decisions couples make as to who will drop out of the labour force to care for children, whose 
career will determine the location of the family, etc. To some extent, the same argument can apply to 
educational decisions and choice of field of study (Blau and Kahn, 2007). 
2.  From labour market disparities to discrimination 
The presence or absence of labour market discrimination cannot be ascertained by simply looking at 
gaps in labour market performance, even when these gaps are adjusted for many observable characteristics. 
Indeed,  any  unexplained  residual  cannot  be  attributed  entirely  to  discrimination.  The  identification  of 
possible discrimination requires either controlled experiments or the selection of exogenous variables that 
are likely to affect labour market disparities mainly through discrimination. But before going further in the 
empirical analysis of the potential contribution of discrimination to the observed differences in labour 
market performance by gender and ethnic groups, the concept of discrimination itself needs to be defined 
and understood more precisely. 
2.1.  Entering into the black box 
In this chapter, following the definition used in mainstream labour economics, discrimination in the 
labour market is defined as “a situation in which persons who provide labour market services and who are 
equally  productive  in  physical  or  material  sense  are  treated  unequally  in  a  way  that  is  related  to  an 
observable characteristics such as race, ethnicity or gender” (see Altonji and Blank, 1999, p. 3168). This 
begs  the  following  questions:  What  are  the  rationales  for  employers  to  offer  different  employment 
opportunities and/or different wages to equally productive workers? Or alternatively, how may market 
forces  allow  discrimination  to  arise  and  persist?  Answering  these  questions  is  important  because  the 
different, and usually complementary, explanations put forward by the economic theory allow selecting the 
exogenous variables that can be used empirically to identify discrimination when controlled experiments 
are unavailable or inconclusive.
11 
                                                       
11.  In  addition,  the  menu  of  available  policy  instruments,  will  depend,  at  least  in  part,  on  the  nature  of 
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The  first,  and  perhaps  most  straightforward,  explanation  proposed  by  economists  is  based  on 
employers having a taste or preference to be associated with some persons instead of others. However, by 
forsaking productive minority employees, prejudiced employers lose profit opportunities, and this type of 
discrimination should be smaller, the greater the degree of competition in the product market (see Box 3.1). 
In  virtually  all  alternative  explanations  for  labour  market  discrimination,  imperfect  information  about 
workers’ abilities constitutes the core rationale for discrimination to arise. If employers cannot measure the 
exact productivity  of heterogeneous  job applicants, they use their  beliefs  and whatever  information is 
available  to  estimate  applicants’  potential  productivity.  This  information  may  include  such  obvious 
indicators as education, previous experience and references, but also race or sex if employers believe them 
to be useful, i.e. correlated with the unobserved determinants of performance. To some extent, individuals 
belonging to the same group will be assigned the same expected ability by employers. As a result, wage 
and job offers will depend on both individual indicators and his/her group’s average characteristics. In that 
case, persistent wage and employment differentials may arise between workers with the same productivity 
who belong to different, identifiable groups, even in competitive markets (see Box 3.1). 
Box 3.1. Some theoretical considerations on labour market discrimination 
Following the seminal work by Becker (1957), a core explanation for labour market discrimination is based on 
economic agents having a taste or preference to be associated with some persons instead of others, which can be 
held by employers, employees or consumers (for recent surveys, see Altonji and Blank, 1999; and Donohue, 2005). In 
this theory of “taste-based” discrimination, prejudiced consumers derive their utility both from consumption of goods 
and  services  and  from  the  type  of  person  engaging  in  market  transactions  with  them.  Similarly,  when  employing 
minority workers, prejudiced employers act as if they must not only pay the market wage, but also pay a so-called 
“discriminatory psychic penalty” (a similar argument applies in the case of prejudiced co-workers). Just as a labour tax 
would be expected to lower employment and/or wages of workers in a competitive market, this penalty lowers the 
quantity demanded and earnings of minorities. And the greater the number of prejudiced employers, or the stronger 
the intensity of their preference, the greater are the wage and employment gaps between the two groups of workers. 
Besides, even if there are enough unprejudiced employers around to hire all minority workers, wage disparities may 
persist. In the presence of any labour market imperfection that renders job search costly, unprejudiced employers will 
take advantage of the fact that minority workers have less attractive labour market alternatives to offer them lower 
wages (Black, 1995). 
One of the key features of “taste-based” discrimination, when based on employers’ tastes, is that it burdens not 
only discriminated workers, but also imposes a cost on prejudiced employers. Indeed, by giving up productive minority 
employees, discriminatory employers bear higher average labour costs and thus lose profit opportunities. Hence, this 
kind of  discrimination should  be reduced by increased competitive  pressure, which would limit entry, survival and 
market shares of prejudiced employers in the product market. Yet, even if a perfectly competitive product market were 
attainable, this might not guarantee the full elimination of “taste-based” discrimination. For instance, if employers form 
a  heterogeneous  population  with  different  entrepreneurial  abilities,  some  prejudiced  employers  – those  with  high 
entrepreneurial abilities – will still remain on the market. This, combined with the fact that only a few prejudiced firms 
may cause employment and wage disparities between minority and majority workers to arise when job search is costly, 
will  lead  to  a  situation  where  competitive  product  markets  are  compatible  with  some  forms  of  “taste-based” 
discrimination.
a 
Virtually all other explanations for labour market discrimination are not based on preferences. Instead, imperfect 
information  about workers’ abilities constitutes the key rationale for discrimination to arise, which is usually called 
“statistical discrimination” (see Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Altonji and Blank, 1999; and Donohue, 2005, for recent 
surveys). A basic premise is that easily observable characteristics, such as sex or ethnic origin, may convey some 
additional information about workers’ productivity and it is costly or impossible to develop individual tests to infer their 
productivity  more  precisely.  In  other  words,  employers  simply  postulate  that  such  individual  characteristics  are 
correlated with the unobserved determinants of performance. Hence, hiring and wage decisions are in part based on 
prior beliefs or stereotypes, be they true or false. Individuals are partly assigned the expected abilities of the group they 
belong to, which constitutes a rational (and potentially privately efficient) response of firms to uncertainty about an 
individual's productivity, given its information and beliefs and the cost of resolving that uncertainty. 
As a result, minority workers with above-average ability receive lower wages than majority workers of similar 










































likely to be observed at the individual level only: on average, wage differentials will reflect the average differential in 
productivity between the two groups of workers. Obviously, this statement does not hold anymore in the case of false 
stereotypes. Besides, even in the absence of strong prior beliefs or stereotypes, minority and majority workers with the 
same  distribution  of  abilities  may  be  treated  differently  if  employers  are  more  accurate  judges  of  the  talents  of 
nonminority workers than of minority workers (Aigner and Cain, 1977). Here again, the optimal statistical rule that 
employers apply to set employment and wage levels will imply that minority workers with above-average ability receive 
lower wages than majority workers of similar abilities (the reverse being true for those minority workers with the lowest 
abilities). And on average, minority workers receive lower wages than nonminority, as far as employers have some 
degrees  of  risk  aversion.  Finally,  such  statistical  judgments,  be  they  the  result  of  stereotypes  or  asymmetrical 
information,  might  be  self-confirming.  Preparing  to  work  requires  investment  by  the  worker  and  not  all  of  this 
investment is observable. If an employer is going to judge workers based on his/her prior beliefs and the worker is 
aware  of  this,  there  is  no  or  limited  rewards  for  this  investment.  They  will  not  be  made,  and  then  the  statistical 
judgments will be confirmed. 
a) Likewise, if discrimination does not arise directly from employers or co-workers, but from customers who prefer to 
interact with majority workers and are prepared to pay for this, these discriminatory tastes will remain also in 
competitive markets, preserving wage and employment disparities between minority and majority workers. 
 
2.2.  Direct evidence on discrimination: field experiments 
Evidence of hiring discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds in OECD countries is unambiguous …  
Although limited to discrimination in hiring practices only, audit and correspondence testing studies 
provide the cleanest direct evidence on labour market discrimination. In both cases, carefully matched 
pairs  of  testers  (from  different  gender  or  ethnic  group)  apply  for  the  same  job  and  evidence  on 
discrimination is inferred from the degree of cross-group asymmetry in the distribution of successes. While 
audit studies use real testers, typically professional actors, and allow investigation of all stages of the 
recruitment process, correspondence tests are based on sending written job applications only, and successes 
are simply measured as call-backs to interviews. However, the main advantage of correspondence tests is 
that all aspects of the experiment can be controlled for. By contrast, several researchers have argued that 
the  main  weakness  of  audit  studies  is  that,  insofar  as  they  involve  actors,  they  cannot  prove  that 
experimental conditions are completely controlled for (see Box 3.2). 
Corresponding  tests  on  ethnic  discrimination  have  been  done  in  at  least  nine OECD  countries 
(Table 3.1).
  Estimated  discrimination  rates  vary  across  studies,  due  not  only  to  geographical  location 
(country and region or city) but also to type of jobs and minority groups tested.
12 But, all studies yield 
significant estimates. Overall, they show that the probability of being called back for an interview after an 
application is several percentage points lower for minority-group applicants. These results are confirmed 
by audit studies. Keeping in mind the caveats mentioned above, they also suggest that discrimination at the 
shortlisting stage is also reflected in fewer jobs offered to minority-group members.
13 
                                                       
12.  Two alternative measures of the discrimination rate are reported in the table. They differ with respect to the 
way  the  event  of  no  callback  for  both  applicants  is  treated.  According  to  Heckman  (1998),  this  is 
equivalent to evidence of equal treatment and must be included in the denominator for the computation of 
the rate. By contrast, Riach and Rich (2002) argue that it provides no information and should be excluded. 
McNemar’s tests (see Somes, 1983), used in the table to compare results from the different studies, are 
however independent from the chosen definition. Three studies for France (Amadieu, 2004, 2005, 2007) 
are not included in Table 3.1 since it is not possible to present their results using standard definitions of 
discrimination rates. Nevertheless, results from these studies appear consistent with those presented in the 
table. 
13.  See e.g. Kenney and Wissoker (1994), Bendick (1998), Nunes and Seligman (1999), de Prada et al. (1996), 
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Box 3.2. Audits and correspondence tests: strengths and weaknesses 
The technique of audit studies (also known as situational tests) consists of having randomly selected pairs of 
testers applying for a specific job over the telephone or in writing and, eventually, attending the job interview. Testers, 
who are usually specifically-trained professional actors from two different ethnic or gender groups, are matched on 
their characteristics, in such a way that they are supposed to differ only with respect to race or gender, while having 
similar fictitious backgrounds and personal attributes. Majority-group testers represent therefore a control group for 
their matched minority-group testers. The experiment is then repeated for several job vacancies, possibly with multiple 
testers. It is then possible to count the number of occurrences in which testers from each group are successful and 
devise an estimate of the hiring discrimination rate from this comparison. This technique has been used extensively in 
UK and US studies concerning both race and gender differences in hirings (see Riach and Rich, 2002 for a survey). It 
has  also been used in ILO studies on immigrant workers, which concern several OECD countries (see Simeone, 
2005). 
Audit studies, however, have a number of weaknesses. First, matched testers should be equal in employers’ 
eyes except for gender or ethnic origin. Despite training and the use of professional actors, it is often very difficult to 
provide a compelling proof that matched testers are identical in all respects. Heckman (1998) notes that testers might 
differ with respect to some attribute that employers regard as valuable but that cannot be easily codified (say, social 
capital shown in interpersonal relationships) and therefore controlled in audit experiments. In particular, depending on 
the distribution of such attributes among testers, different results might come out from the audit study (including a 
finding of no or reverse discrimination when discrimination actually takes place). Second, audit studies are not double-
blind, in the sense that testers know the purpose of the experiment and might consciously or unconsciously try to 
influence  the  outcome  (Bertrand  and  Mullainathan,  2004).  In  addition,  audit  studies  are  expensive,  which  limits 
dramatically the number of testers that can be used as well as the number of jobs testers can apply for. As a result, the 
study design is usually circumscribed to specific jobs and characteristics (narrowly-defined occupation profiles, one 
single level of educational attainment,  etc.), making it difficult to assess whether results are representative  of the 
reference population of firms, jobs and workers. 
Correspondence  testing  studies,  by  contrast,  circumvent  most  of  these  limitations.  The  principle  of  the 
correspondence test is that pairs of carefully-matched fictitious resumes are sent in response to real job ads posted on 
some pre-defined media (e.g. newspapers, internet websites, etc.), and the success of majority and minority groups is 
measured by call-backs to interviews. Insofar as resumes are fictitious, a pool of similar resumes can be generated 
and they can be randomly assigned to fictitious applicants. Remaining within-pair differences in terms of characteristics 
are therefore random, except for those identifying gender or ethnicity. Ethnic-sounding names and/or place of birth are 
typically used in the latter case. When place of birth is used, however, immigrants have typically migrated with their 
family when young and they have received their whole education in the host country. The fact that all applicants are 
fictitious allows a perfect control of observable characteristics, complete disclosure of experimental details (including all 
resumes), and in principle, a relatively large sample (even though large samples are rare in practice; see in particular 
Bertrand  and  Mullainathan,  2004;  and  Carlsson  and  Rooth,  2007).  However,  in  contrast  with  audit  studies, 
discrimination is measured here as differences in invitations to an interview rather than in job offers, which might result 
in  biased  measures  of  hiring  discrimination  rates,  if  there  are  cross-group  differences  in  call-backs  that  are  not 
reflected in cross-group differences in job offers. However, usually no reverse discrimination is found in audit studies 
conditional to admission to interview. Therefore
 one can argue that discrimination in callbacks implies overall hiring 
discrimination and, hence, correspondence testing studies provide at least qualitative evidence on the presence and 











































Table 3.1. Ethnic minorities have a lower probability of being called back for an interview 
















Net rate of 
discrimination 
% points, 





as a % of call-










business sales assistant, pre-
school teacher, compulsory 
school teacher, accountant, 
nurse, construction worker, 
restaurant worker, shop sales 












Manager, clerk, nurse, hotel 
and restaurant worker, 
construction worker, 
technician, factory worker, 
motor-vehicle driver 
Name (African)   17.7***  54.1***  205.0 
Duguet et al. 
(2007) 
FRA 
(Ile de France), 
2006 









support worker, clerk, 
customer service worker 
Name (African-
American) 
4.9***  29.5***  49.6 





Various jobs, mainly waiter, 
sales assistant, clerk, manual 
worker and representative 







Trained medical doctor 
(senior house officer) 












10.0***  35.3***  88.9 




region and Berlin) 
1994 
Medical gymnast, foreign 
language correspondent, sales 
assistant, industrial merchant, 
banking salesman, 
construction draughtsman, 
designer, lay-out worker, 
assistant computer worker, 
nurse 
Name and 
country of birth 
(Turkish) 
2.1***  9.7***  11.9 





Primary or secondary school 
teacher, laboratory assistant, 
administrator, financial 
manager, personnel manager 
Name and 
country of birth 
(Surinamese) 







Trained medical doctor 
(senior house officer) 
Name (Asian)  19.4**  50.0**  100.0 




Secretary, sales representative 
and clerk 
Name (Greek and 
Vietnamese) 
8.9***  17.7***  21.7 
Firth (1981)  GBR (England) 
1977-1988 
Accountant, financial manager  Name and 
country of birth 
(Asian and 
African) 
29.9***  43.8***  80.1 
a) Difference in the number of call-backs between majority and minority groups as a percentage of the number of jobs applied for 
(jobs for which no call-back is registered are treated as providing evidence of equal treatment); 
b) Difference in the number of call-backs as a percentage of jobs applied for with at least one observed call-back (jobs for which no 
call-back is registered are excluded from the sample); 
c) This figure corresponds to the percentage increase in applications required for minority-group members to have the same call-back 
chances as majority-group members. *, **, ***: statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively (based on McNemar’s 
exact test, except for the study by Duguet et al. (2007), where it is based on tests reported by the authors). 
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What is the economic cost that ethnic minorities have to pay to equalize the number of call-backs of 
their majority-group counterparts? As shown in the last column of Table 3.1, ethnic minority applicants 
typically need to send between 40% and 50% more applications to receive the same number of call-backs 
as their majority-group counterparts, with lower figures only in a few cases. Assuming that minority and 
majority-group members have the same ability of searching for new job vacancies, and have the same 
chances as majority-group members to receive a job offer conditional to the interview,
14 this figure would 
imply that minority-group members typically have to search on average for 40% to 50% longer than their 
majority-group  counterparts  before  receiving  a  job  offer,  which,  if  unemployed,  translates  into 
correspondingly longer unemployment durations.
15 Additional information can be gathered from studies in 
which  variations  of  personal  characteristics  have  been  explored  in  such  a  way  that  returns  to  these 
characteristics  can  be  estimated  and  compared  with  discrimination  rates.  For  instance,  Bertrand  and 
Mullainathan (2004) show that, in their samples for Boston and Chicago, blacks need eight additional years 
of labour market experience to equalize the call-back probability of whites. 
… and the few existing large scale experiments show that women fare better in “blind” recruitments 
Correspondence  testing  and  audit  studies  on  gender  are  much  less  numerous  and  are  also  less 
conclusive.  In  fact,  any  gender  discrimination  pattern  appears  to  depend  crucially  on  the  type  of 
occupation. Given the specific nature of these studies, which often focus on a small number of occupations 
in a given geographical area, it is difficult to make even rough inferences on the impact of discriminatory 
behaviours on aggregate hiring and employment patterns. In general, until the end of the 1990s, all studies 
tended  to  find  discrimination  against  women  in  male-dominated  and  mixed  occupations  – i.e.  in 
occupations where the share of women is below a certain threshold in national statistics – and reverse 
discrimination  (or  discrimination  against  men)  in  female-dominated  occupations  (see  Riach  and  Rich, 
2002, for a survey). Recent correspondence-testing evidence confirms that the way employers shortlist 
applicants can increase gender segregation in the labour market because estimated discrimination rates are 
closely related to the share of women in a particular occupation. Nonetheless, these recent studies provide 
a more mixed picture,
16 which might point to a decrease in the incidence of hiring discrimination against 
women over time. However, the limited sample size per occupation and the limited number of sampled 
occupations of these studies suggests that no firm conclusion can be derived from them on this issue. In her 
study of the French banking industry, Petit (2007), by focusing on all occupations in a single industry 
where women are over-represented in employment with respect to the national average, partially tackles 
these problems. She finds that childless women aged 25 years applying for high-skilled jobs need to send 
out 30% more applications than their male counterparts to obtain the same number of interviews.
17 
So-called “blind” recruitment procedures are sometimes used by employers. In many cases, these 
procedures  can  provide  large  scale  quasi-natural  experiments,  overcoming  the  problem  related  to  the 
limited sample size and number of sampled occupations of certain correspondence tests and audit studies. 
For instance, a  number of US orchestras modified  their recruitment procedures  since the  1970s,  often 
adopting a screen or other device to hide the auditioning musician from the recruitment committee. In a 
                                                       
14.  These are cautious assumptions insofar as ethnic minorities are likely to be less efficient in searching for 
new  vacancies  and,  as  suggested  by audit  studies,  are likely  to  have  a lower  probability  of  job  offer 
conditional to being granted an interview. 
15.  Assuming that the arrival of advertised job vacancies follows an exponential distribution and that search 
effort does not vary across groups and along the unemployment spell. The latter assumption is undoubtedly 
restrictive. 
16.  See Weichselbaumer (2004) for Austria, Riach and Rich (2006) for the United Kingdom and Carlsson 
(2007) for Sweden. 










































famous paper, Goldin and Rouse (2000) exploit differences in the recruitment procedures across orchestras 
to show that the use of blind auditions increased dramatically the proportion of hired women. Similarly, 
between October 2004 and June 2006 two districts of the Swedish city of Gothenburg participated in a 
pilot programme involving recruitment based only on strictly anonymous job applications. Aslund and 
Nordström Skans (2007) evaluate the policy pilot by using applications in another similar city district as a 
control group. They find that anonymous application procedures increased the probability of call-back by 
more than 20% for both women and immigrants of non-western origin, eliminating all gender and ethnic 
differences in callbacks. However, while women appear to have benefited from the scheme also in terms of 
job offers, no such gain was estimated for immigrants.
18 
Taken  as  a  whole,  field  experiments  offer  an  impressive  snapshot  of  the  occurrence  of  hiring 
discrimination, particularly as regards ethnic minorities. The main strengths of these studies are that the 
experimental set-up is controlled and they focus on the overall effect of discriminatory behaviours. This 
implies that, if there are multiple discriminatory behaviours related to different sources of discrimination 
(due, for instance, to stereotypes and preferences, see Box 3.1 above), it is the average effect resulting from 
the addition of these behaviours that emerges in field experiments, which is the first element that matters 
for policy and policy evaluation. The disadvantage of many field experiments is, however, that they are 
often confined to small samples of occupations, and it is sometimes difficult to understand how results that 
do not unanimously point in the same direction can be generalised. As discussed above, this problem is 
relevant  for  gender  discrimination.  In  the  studies  where  this  issue  is  taken  into  account,  hiring 
discrimination  against  women  appears  to  emerge.  Yet,  these  studies  are  too  few  to  draw  general 
conclusions. 
2.3.  Indirect evidence on specific sources of discrimination 
In contrast with field experiments, most studies testing propositions derived from theoretical models 
are  designed  to  provide  evidence  on  one  or  more  specific  sources  of  discrimination.  As  such,  when 
evidence of one type of discrimination is found, these studies yield a lower bound of the extent of overall 
discrimination – that is, they may account for discrimination derived from one source (e.g. taste-based 
discrimination), but not others (e.g. statistical discrimination). This principle holds unless two different 
sources of discrimination elicit discriminatory behaviours that mutually cancel each other, which seems a 
priori unlikely. In other words, if the goal is to know the extent of overall discrimination, this class of 
approaches sheds additional light only when clear-cut evidence on the type of discrimination which is the 
object of study emerges.
19 But unlike field experiments, these studies typically cover a large number of 
occupations  as  well  as  large  geographical  areas.  Thus,  they  can  provide  valuable  complementary 
information on overall discrimination, particularly when evidence from field experiments is less clear-cut 
or can be more difficult to generalise, such as in the case of gender discrimination. 
                                                       
18.  One can perhaps explain this latter finding on the basis of the extreme requirements of the recruitment 
procedure required by the Gothenburg pilot. Applicants were in fact asked to erase from their resumes all 
information from which origin could be identified, including geographical location of schools. The latter is 
much  more  likely  to  confound  the  experimental  outcome  in  the  case  of  non-western  immigrants. 
Unfortunately, information on the second generation, which would have provided a more reliable test, is 
not available in these data. 
19.  For instance, in a famous paper, Altonji and Pierret (2001) argue that if firms statistically discriminate on 
the basis of race or gender because they use race or gender to proxy for characteristics that are difficult to 
observe at the time of hiring, as they learn about the real productivity of their employees over time, wage 
returns to race and gender should fall. They apply this intuition to US data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth and find no evidence that the wage penalty for blacks decrease with experience. Yet, 
while providing evidence of lack of statistical discrimination, Altonji and Pierret’s results are consistent 
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Many US studies show indirect evidence of discrimination against women and minorities 
Many studies on US data have searched for indirect evidence of taste-based discrimination by testing 
predictions derived from theory. As discussed above, if discrimination is mainly based on employers’ 
preferences, or more generally if it is privately inefficient, discriminatory firms should earn lower profits 
and discrimination should therefore be reduced by greater competitive pressure in product markets (see 
Box 3.1). More specifically, many studies have looked at the relationship between measures of product 
market competition and employment or wage gaps by gender or ethnic origin. If no additional explanation 
for  a  negative  relationship  between  competition  and  labour  market  gaps  can  be  provided,  empirically 
establishing such a relationship would provide supporting indirect evidence of discrimination. Overall, 
with few exceptions, US studies of the relationship between product market competition and employment 
or wage gaps suggest that discrimination has been playing a role in shaping both gender and race gaps in 










































Box 3.3. Evidence on taste-based discrimination from country-specific studies 
If  discrimination  is  mainly  based  on  employers’  preferences,  or  more  generally  if  it  is  privately  inefficient, 
discriminatory firms should earn lower profits, and discrimination be reduced by greater competitive pressure (see 
Box 3.1). In order to find evidence for these predictions, a few studies use US firm-level data to look at the relationship 
between employment composition by ethnic origin or gender and either the gap between productivity and wages or 
profitability. For example, Hellerstein et al. (1999) use matched employer-employee data and find that lower relative 
earnings of women do not appear to be entirely reflected in lower marginal productivities while lower relative earnings 
of blacks do, suggesting a pattern of discrimination against women. Hellerstein et al. (2002) find a positive relationship 
between  the  percentage  of  female  employees  and  profitability  in  plants  with  large  market  shares  (interpreted  as 
operating in relatively non-competitive segments of the market), but not in small-share plants (interpreted as belonging 
to  competitive  segments).  They  conclude  that  these  findings  are  consistent  with  presence  of  taste-based 
discrimination. 
A more popular alternative, which dates back to Becker (1957), is to look at the relationship between measures of 
product market competition and employment or wage gaps by gender or ethnic origin. Many US studies in the 1970s 
and the 1980s looked at the relationship between market concentration and race or gender employment gaps using 
cross-sectional  industry-  or firm-level  data  and  usually found  that  greater  market  concentration  is  associated  with 
greater  employment  and  wage  gaps  (see  e.g.  Ashenfelter  and  Hannan,  1986;  Heywood  and  Peoples,  1994;  and 
references cited therein).
a A problem with these early studies is, however, that the use of market concentration as an 
indicator of lack of market competition have been increasingly challenged in the industrial organization literature (see 
for  example  Boone,  2008;  and  Aghion  et  al.,  2005).  More  recent  studies  have  explored  alternative  measures  of 
competition. For example, Black and Brainerd (2004) use import penetration as an indicator of competition. They look 
at the differential effect of the generalised increase in import penetration in the United States between 1976 and 1993 
on the gender wage gap between industries with different degrees of concentration at the beginning of the period. 
They unambiguously find that import penetration had a greater negative impact on the gender wage gap in previously 
concentrated industries, suggesting that foreign competition tends to reduce gender discrimination. The identification 
assumption here is that the growth of import penetration is likely to have increased competitive pressure more in 
previously sheltered industries. Other studies used deregulation of specific industries to identify changes in competitive 
conditions. In particular, several papers investigated deregulation in the US road transport industry on race and gender 
wage and employment differentials (Peoples and Saunders, 1993; Heywood and Peoples, 1994; Schwarz-Miller and 
Talley,  2000),  finding  unambiguously  that  deregulation  reduced  gaps.  Identification  in  these  studies  is,  however, 
essentially based on the date of the federal reform. As a consequence, it is possible that their results are driven by 
omitted variables with distinct time profile. Black and Strahan (2001) in their study of the effect of deregulation in the 
US banking industry, sort this problem out by using cross-state differences in the date of deregulation. They find that, 
although  wages  generally  decreased  after  deregulation,  the  adjustment  affected  disproportionately  men.  In  the 
aftermath of deregulation, the gender wage gap fell on average by 9 percentage points and the share of women in 
managerial positions increased. 
There are also several US studies that try to identify the role of customers’ preferences in eliciting discriminatory 
hiring practices of employers. Most of these studies use the race structure of local neighbourhoods where firms are 
located to infer the race composition of customers (e.g. Kenney and Wissoker, 1994; Stoll et al., 2000) and usually find 
a negative impact of the concentration of whites in a neighbourhood on employment or hirings of blacks and hispanics, 
although not always significant. More compelling, Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1998) use firm data on actual customers and 
find that a 10 percentage point fall in the share of white customers raises the probability of hiring blacks by about 20%, 
even controlling for the share of black applicants, while no significant effect is found on wages. There are also many 
case studies of specific industries such as professional sports (see Depken and Ford, 2006, and references cited 
therein) and fast-foods (Ihlanfeldt and Young, 1994). Nevertheless, due to the specificity of the studied industries, it is 
difficult to draw general conclusions from these case studies. 
There are only few studies searching for indirect evidence on discrimination in other countries. Hellerstein and 
Neumark (1999) find no significant discrepancies between gender gaps in wages and productivities in Israeli data. 
Roed and Schone (2006) find that profitability is positively related to the share of women in Norwegian establishments 
whose managers declare them to be exposed to fierce competition. Conversely, no such a relationship is found for 
non-western immigrants. Winter-Ebmer (1995) finds no association between product market concentration and the 
gender wage gap in Austria but a negative association of the former with the range of job opportunities offered to 
women. Jolliffe and Campos (2005) note that, during the transition to a market economy, the Hungarian gender wage 
gap was halved and this pattern was entirely due to the fall in the component of the wage gap that is not explained by 
observed individual characteristics. They interpret this finding as showing the effect of deregulation on discrimination, 
but other explanations are also possible. 
a) Two recent exceptions are Coleman (2002, 2004) who find no or even the opposite relationship between market 
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Cross-country analysis show that product market deregulation reduces gender gaps in employment and 
wages, thereby yielding evidence of discrimination in the OECD area 
Outside the United States, country-specific studies searching for indirect evidence on discrimination 
are scarce (see Box 3.3). Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) is the only study providing cross-
country evidence on the relationship between anti-competitive regulation and the gender wage gap. They 
use  meta-data  covering  over  1 500 studies  of  the  gender  wage  gap  in  several  OECD  and  non-OECD 
countries and explore the relationship between the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index, which they 
take as a proxy for competition, and the component of the wage gap that is not accounted by observable 
characteristics.
20 They find that competition reduces the wage gap, although results for OECD countries are 
not always robust.
21 
For  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  further  international  evidence  on  the  impact  of  product  market 
competition on the gender employment and wage gaps is estimated by extending the methodology used by 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007). In particular, two separate aggregate analyses of the impact of 
regulatory barriers in the product market and the gender employment and wage gap are undertaken (see 
Box 3.4 for the methodology). OECD aggregate indicators of anti-competive product market regulation in 
a few non-manufacturing industries – utilities, transports and communications – are used to proxy the 
overall regulatory stance of a country in a given year, consistent with previous OECD work (e.g. Bassanini 
and Duval, 2006). 
Box 3.4. Model specification 
The following simple linear regression model is estimated for the aggregate gender employment gap: 
  it i t i it it it T X PMR EG ε δ λ µ β α + + + + + =  
where EG, PMR, and X stand for the working-age population gender employment gap, product market regulation 
and a vector of control variables, respectively, while µ, λ and T stand for country i fixed effects, time t effects and 
(country-specific) time trends, α and β are parameters to be estimated and ε is a standard error term. In the analysis of 
ratification  of  international  anti-discrimination  conventions  (see  Section 3),  indexes  of  convention  ratifications  are 
added to the equation above. Depending on the specification, control variables include the share of services in GDP, 
union  density,  employment  protection  legislation,  the  degree  of  corporatism,  the  tax  wedge,  the  average 
unemployment benefit replacement rate, various indicators of family policy, the output gap, import penetration, various 
indicators of human capital, the gender gap in labour force participation and the aggregate employment rate. The latter 
two are key control variables: the former represents labour supply factors and the latter proxies the effect of aggregate 
labour demand. Insofar as product market regulation is likely to affect aggregate demand, the coefficient of PMR might 
capture  the  effect  of  regulatory  reforms  on  labour  demand  and  cannot  be  interpreted  as  yielding  evidence  on 
discrimination. To sort this problem out, the model above is also estimated in two steps. First, the employment gap is 
regressed on the participation gap and the aggregate employment rate plus country and time effects and country-
specific trends; second, the residual from the first step is then regressed on product market regulation, other controls 
and country and time effects and country-specific trends. The estimated effect of regulation can then be interpreted as 
its  effect  over  and  above  its  impact  on  aggregate  demand.  Only  two-step  estimates  are  reported  here,  although 
differences from standard, single-step, OLS estimates are minor. 
The same specification as above is used in the analysis of the wage gap, except for the dependent variable. The 
latter  is  the  set  of  country-year  fixed  effects  from  the  estimation  of  a  meta-regression  specification  on  meta-data 
concerning  the  component  of  the  wage  gap  that  is  not  accounted  by  observable  characteristics  – the  so-called 
unexplained wage residual. Data from Weichselbaumer and Winter Ebmer (2005 – kindly provided by the authors), 
matched with additional estimates of the unexplained wage-gap residual obtained for the purpose of this chapter in 
13 European  countries  using  ECHP  data  (see  Annex  3.B),  are  used  here.  Fixed-effects  are  obtained  from  a 
                                                       
20.  By so doing, they limit the analysis to papers providing at least one estimate of the unexplained residual 
using regression-based decomposition (see Annex 3.B) or dummy variables in a wage regression. 
21.  In  particular, the estimated coefficient  of competition becomes insignificant and even changes  sign in 










































specification  in  which  the  wage  residual  is  regressed  on  meta-variables  including:  i)  variables  concerning  data 
selection; ii) variables capturing econometric and  decomposition methods; and iii) variables specifying the type of 
controls included in the regressions from which unexplained wage gap residuals were obtained. 
The  aggregate  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  the  employment  gap  is  supplemented  with  an  industry-level 
analysis. As regulatory indicators are available for few industries only at the available level of disaggregation, following 
Griffith, Harrison and Simpson (2006), average profitability, defined as the ratio of output to intermediate input, labour 
and capital costs, is used as a proxy for product market power (and therefore of lack of competition). The estimated 
model can be written as: 
  it j it ijt ijt ijt X P EG ε η µ β α + + + + =  
where P stands for  average profitability of industry j in country i at time t, X for a vector of controls defined at the 
country,  time  and  industry  level,  while  µ  and  η  captures  country-by-time  and  industry  fixed  effects,  the  former 
controlling for all aggregate factors including determinants of labour market participation. To control for the overall 
labour demand  of the industry, all specifications include the logarithm of total employment in the industry and its 
interaction  with  the  average  degree  of  coverage  of  collective  bargaining  agreements.  In  a  number  of  estimates, 
variables capturing the industry composition of the labour force by age, education, firm size and part-time status are 
included. In addition, industry-by-time effects are also included to control for industry-specific trends.
a The results of 
this industry-level analysis are presented in Annex 3.B. 
More details on the methodology used to estimate aggregate and industry-level equations as well as full results 
are available in Annex 3.B. 
a) One problem with the use of average profitability indicators is that they might be endogenous. Various strategies are 
used to cope with this problem including estimating the impact on industry-specific regulation data on a restricted 
sample and using these indicators as instruments for profitability on the same reduced sample. 
 
Anti-competitive  product  market  regulation  appears  to  be  positively  associated  with  the  gender 
employment gap (Figure 3.6),
 22 and in particular with the portion of the gap that it is not accounted for by 
gender differences in labour supply and aggregate labour demand.
23 Such a relationship appears to hold 
even when controls for the sectoral structure of demand and other institutions and policies – capturing 
inter-alia the demand-side effect of the bargaining power of insiders, family-related tax policy and family-
friendly policies –
24 are included in the analysis (see Annex 3.B, for full results). Overall, it appears that 
between 7% and 9% of the cross-country/time-series variation of the gender employment gap in OECD 
countries  can  be  explained  by  variation  in  regulatory  barriers.
25  The  large  liberalisation  reform  effort 
                                                       
22.  The regression analysis is performed on data concerning 21 OECD countries between 1975 and 2003 for 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands,  Norway,  New  Zealand,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United Kingdom, 
United States. 
23.  The aggregate employment rate is included to avoid that the estimated coefficient of regulation capture also 
the  effect  of  regulatory  reforms  on  aggregate  demand,  whose  movements  are  likely  to  affect 
disproportionately disadvantaged groups such as women, thus not being interpretable as yielding evidence 
on discrimination. Note that this problem is unlikely to be relevant for industry-specific studies, such as 
those reviewed in Box 3.3. 
24.  As the indicator of product market regulation that is used here is based on regulation in non-manufacturing 
industries, one can expect that its estimated coefficient partially reflects this structural shift rather than its 
effect on discriminatory behaviours. For this reason, the service sector share is included in most regression 
models. In addition, deregulation in the product market, by reducing the size of rents, might reduce the 
bargaining power of insiders, thereby increasing opportunities for women who are more represented among 
outsiders.  To  control  for  this  effect,  most  specifications  include  various  labour  market  institutions, 
including trade union density, whose time path can proxy the evolution of insiders’ strength (see also 
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undertaken by most OECD countries in the last thirty years accounts on average for about 10% of the 
narrowing of the employment gap. This figure can be considered a lower bound estimate of the share of the 
contribution of the reduction in the extent of discrimination to the narrowing of the employment gap, 
provided that other sources of discrimination (e.g. consumer-based or statistical discrimination) do not 
induce reverse discrimination against men, which seems rather unlikely. Moreover, the average OECD 
country can still gain significantly from further deregulation. Taking estimates at face value, if all countries 
liberalised their product markets to the level of the United Kingdom, the most deregulated country in 2003, 
the OECD average of gender employment gaps would fall by 1 to 1.5 percentage points from its 2003 
level. 
Figure 3.6. Pro-competitive regulatory reforms in the product market lower 
the gender employment and wage gaps 
Estimated percentage-point effect of a 1.2 point fall in the anti-competitive regulation index, 












Employment gap Wage gap
Minimum Maximum
 
Interpretation: The chart shows that a 1.2 point fall in the index of anti-competitive product market regulation 
(corresponding to the difference between the OECD average and the least regulated country in 2003) would narrow 
the employment gap by between 0.8 and 1.3 percentage points and the wage gap by between 3.8 and 4.9 percentage 
points. 
Note: The chart presents minimum and maximum point estimates obtained from the different specifications. For the 
wage gap, the sample is 1975-2001, and reported estimates are based on a sample that excludes three outliers. 
*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Source: OECD estimates (see Annex 3.B, for detailed results). 
As discussed above, it is important to check that, within the same period of analysis, deregulation did 
not have the opposite effect on employment and wages. In fact, if that were true, one could argue that 
liberalisation  reforms  simply  shifted  the  equilibrium  in  the  labour  market  without  changing  relative 
demand conditions across gender, which would be inconsistent with a relationship between competition 
and discrimination. A meta-analysis of the wage gap on a comparable sample of countries and years,
26 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25.  These figures are obtained by looking at the range of variation of the gender employment gap predicted by 
the range of variation of the indicator of regulation. Not surprisingly, the estimate is relatively small as 
compared with about 85%-90% of such range explained by the gender gap in labour participation and the 
aggregate employment rate. 
26.  The meta-analysis is performed on a strongly unbalanced sample concerning 20 OECD countries between 
1975 and 2001 (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 










































however, suggests that the stringency of product market regulation does have a positive and significant 
effect on the gender wage gap (Figure 3.6), although point estimates should be interpreted with caution due 
to  the  limited  sample  size,  which  results  in  imprecise  estimates  (see  Annex  3.B).
27  It  appears  that 
regulatory barriers to competition explain between 20% and 40% of the cross-country/time-series variation 
in the gender wage gap (and between 35% and 70% of the variation in the component that is not explained 
by easily observable characteristics). Taking the most reliable estimates – where main outliers have been 
excluded – at face value, one can conclude that if all countries deregulated their product markets to the 
level of the United Kingdom, the OECD average of the gender wage gap would fall by 4 to 5 percentage 
points. 
The  relationship  between  product  market  competition  and  labour  market  gaps  that  emerges  in 
aggregate  OECD  data  appears  to  be  confirmed  in  industry-level  data  for  13 European  countries.
28 
Restricting the sample to countries and years where comparable indicators of sector-specific regulation can 
be  defined  for  a  sufficiently large  number  of  industries  (see  Box 3.4  and Annex 3.B),  it appears  that 
deregulation in typically regulated industries – such as utilities, transport and communications – has been 
beneficial to women’s employment. In fact, taking the estimates at face value, about two thirds of the fall 
in the employment gap in these industries can be attributed to deregulation.
29 Moreover, with respect to 
their  male  counterparts,  female  employees  appear  to  be  scarcer  in  industries  and  countries  where  an 
indicator of profitability – the ratio of output to intermediate input, labour and capital costs, used as a 
rough proxy of market power and therefore of lack of competition – is higher. Profitability appears to 
explain between 3.8% and 6.4% of the variation of the employment gap across industries and countries as 
well as over time.
30 
Overall,  available  direct  and  indirect  evidence  suggests  that  discrimination  has  been  playing  an 
important role in shaping labour market gender and ethnic disparities in OECD countries in the past thirty 
years. Moreover, this evidence shows that pro-competitive deregulation in the product market is likely to 
dampen discrimination and that all OECD countries can reduce discrimination further by enhancing their 
reform effort in this field. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
United Kingdom, the United States). To increase sample size, the EPL indicator has been set at its 1982 
values for years preceding that date. 
27.  The sample contains a maximum of 188 country-by-year observations. 
28.  The largest sample covers 16 industries in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden from 1992 to 2002. The sample is limited by 
availability of industry-level gender gaps and profitability indicators. 
29.  If one looks at the range of variation of employment gaps that is explained by regulatory indicators, a much 
smaller figure is found : only 4% of the variation across industries, countries and over time is explained by 
regulatory indicators (9% if the comparison is limited to utilities, transport and communications where 
indicators  vary  across countries and  over time).  This is not surprising since  the range  of  variation  of 
employment gaps in the sample is much greater than the corresponding variation in aggregate data, due 
mainly to large cross-industry differences in the share of women in employment. Given these differences, it 
can be argued that gender differences in the logarithm of employment are a more appropriate dependent 
variable. A sensitivity analysis, however, shows that results are not affected by changing the dependent 
variable. 
30.  This result is confirmed by instrumental variable estimates where regulatory indicators are used as an 
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Deregulation alone might not suffice, therefore specific anti-discrimination legislation is necessary 
These  findings  do  not  imply,  however,  that  market  deregulation  can  eliminate  labour  market 
discrimination  by  gender  or  ethnic  origin.  First,  while  certain  types  of  discrimination  are  affected  by 
product market competition, others are not and will remain in place.
31 Second, imperfections in other 
markets, notably the  labour market, are likely to make taste-based discrimination  persist (see  Box 3.1 
above). Third, while pro-competitive regulatory reforms can improve competitive conditions in a market, 
this  does  not  imply  that  all  inefficient  firms  will  be  eliminated  from  the  market,  as  simple  textbook 
economics would imply. In real-world  markets,  the  most efficient  firms  gain  market  shares  when the 
degree of competition increases, but they rarely take the whole market (see e.g. Boone, 2008). In fact, in 
European  countries  in  the  post-SMP  period,  the  relationship  between  profitability  and  the  gender 
employment gap was no weaker in manufacturing than in non-manufacturing industries (see Annex 3.B), 
even  though  the  degree of stringency  of  regulation and  its change was unambiguously  smaller  in the 
former. Thus, specific anti-discrimination legislation may have an important role to play. 
3.  Anti-discrimination laws across OECD countries 
All OECD countries have integrated anti-discrimination provisions into their legal framework. But in 
many cases, legal measures aimed at protecting individuals against discrimination in the labour market 
have proved to be particularly difficult to enforce. Consequently, most governments have implemented 
comprehensive strategies intended to raise public awareness of discrimination, but also public awareness of 
the laws prohibiting discrimination and individual’s rights as a victim of discrimination. Currently, in a 
number  of  countries,  legal  instruments  are  supplemented  by  an  institutional  framework  that  seeks  to 
establish more effective enforcement mechanisms (see Annex Table 3.A2.1). 
3.1.  Raising public awareness 
Legal rules are not self-enforcing. In all OECD countries, enforcement of anti-discrimination laws 
depends mainly on the action of individuals who feel discriminated against. They are the actors mobilising 
the law (Havinga, 2002; Niessen, 2003). 
Lack of public awareness may impair on the enforcement of legal rules in a number of countries… 
At the very least, workers should know that they have a legal right to equal treatment, so as to enforce 
their rights. Running campaigns to inform individuals of their legal rights is thus crucial, and this is indeed 
part of the actual workload of national equality bodies, in all countries where such bodies exist (Table 3.2). 
But the evidence suggests that public opinion is often ill-informed about such rights. With the notable 
exceptions of Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom, less than half of the 
population of European countries where such information is available knows that discriminating on the 
basis of gender or ethnic origin when hiring new employees is unlawful (Figure 3.7). In addition, public 
awareness of anti-discrimination provisions concerning ethnic origins tends to be less than for gender. This 
may, however, simply reflect the fact that the former targets fewer people than the latter. Public knowledge 
about general rights of discriminated persons is even more limited: on average, only one third of European 
Union  citizens  claim  to  know  their  rights  should  they  be  a  victim  of  discrimination  (European 
Commission, 2007b). 
                                                       
31.  It is even possible that statistical discrimination could increase as a result of deregulation, as firms might 
react to enhanced competition by increasing selection and screening behaviours when hiring (see Autor, 
2001). However, greater competition is perhaps more likely to increase the value of information gathering 




















































Awareness of law prohibiting discrimination on gender when hiring new employees
Awareness of law prohibiting discrimination on ethnic origin when hiring new employees
Awareness of rights if victim of discrimination or harassment
 
Note: The bars correspond to the percentage share of persons answering "Yes" to the question (QA12) "Please tell me whether, in 
your opinion, in your country there is a law which prohibits the following types of discrimination when hiring new employees” for the 
cases  of  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  gender  or  ethnic  origin,  respectively.  The  symbol  corresponds  to  the  share  of  persons 
answering "Yes" to the question (QA14) "Do you know your rights if you are the victim of discrimination or harassment?". 
Source: European Commission (2007b). 
It is also crucial that employers are well-informed about the legal rules and they should be provided 
with tailored and targeted support to help them improve their performance on equality. Most national 
equality bodies issue  codes of good practices or other guidance documents for employers (Table 3.2). 
However, this is done in a less systematic way and often with a lower priority than information campaigns 
targeted at potential victims of discrimination. In Greece (as regards ethnic minorities), Italy, Poland and 
Portugal, national equality bodies do not provide employers with codes of good practices. 
Still,  effective  enforcement  of  legal  rules  largely  relies  upon  employers’  knowledge  and 
understanding of the legal framework. And there are some indications that also in this area margins of 
progress may be substantial. For instance, based on a telephone survey, Havinga (2002) suggests that in 
many cases, the Dutch equal treatment legislation did not give rise to a re-assessment of equal treatment in 
personnel  management:  only  one-third  of  the  organisations  surveyed  reported  that  management  had 
discussed the matter, notably the proportion of men and women or the position of ethnic minorities. In fact, 
the  survey  shows  that  while  most  personnel  managers  know  that  equal  treatment  laws  exist  in  the 
Netherlands, their knowledge about the actual content of the legislation is rather limited. Awareness of 
legal provisions is particularly limited in small firms, which consequently tend to pay little attention to 
unequal treatment and adaptation of internal procedures as a result of the legislation. 
According to the British Arbitration, Conciliatory and Advisory Service (ACAS), the situation in the 
United Kingdom appears to be quite similar. Based on its practical experience of equality and diversity in 
the workplace, ACAS indeed notes that, to date, the understanding of diversity and the implementation of 
ethnic and gender mainstreaming remains the domain of larger organisations with a department of Human 
Resources (ACAS, 2006a). Small and medium-sized firms are statistically less likely to deal with a tribunal 
claim  for  discrimination  than  larger  organisations  and,  therefore,  less  likely  to  develop  any  detailed 
expertise of the issue. And even in large firms, personnel specialists also struggle with the influx of new 
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respect, Phillips et al. (2007) underline that the the legal framework in the United Kingdom has developed 
in  a  piecemeal  and  fragmented  way,  with  provisions  in  many  different  Acts  and  Regulations.  This 
contributes to make it confusing for employers (and individuals), and a starting point for creating a better 
framework for achieving equality could be simpler law, namely a single Equality Act. Likewise, Malheiros 
(2007) stresses that in Portugal, the multitude of laws and Decree-laws makes it hard for people who are 
affected by discrimination and even for lawyers and judges to understand which norm actually applies to 
the case in hand. In fact, this is an area where most countries could usefully take action (see Table 3.2). 
This could be of particular relevance for countries such as the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Mexico, Poland, Portugal and Spain, where the institutional framework surrounding the legal rules is rather 
complex  – promotion and  enforcement  responsibilities being  split  between  several  bodies –  or  not yet 
operational (as in Spain and the Czech Republic), and thus not in a good position to be able to provide 










































Table 3.2. Public awareness of discrimination issues and public access  to the anti-discrimination framework
a 
  Measures aimed at raising public awareness, conducted by equal treatment bodies 
or other specialised bodies
b 















inform the public of 









Australia (FL)  Yes (high)  Yes (medium)  Yes (medium)  Yes (high)  Medium   Low  
Austria (FL)  Yes (low)  Yes (high)  Yes (also done by 
trade unions) 
Yes (high)  Low  Medium  












Medium    Low 
Canada (FL)  Yes (high)  Yes (low)  Yes (medium)  Yes (medium)  Low  Low  
Czech 
Republic  
No   No   No   No   High  No EB 
Denmark  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  High  High 
Finland  Yes 
(gender: low) 
(ethnicity: medium) 
Yes (low)  Yes 
(gender: high) 
(ethnicity: low) 
Yes (low)  High  High 
France  Yes (medium)  Yes (high)  Yes (medium)  Yes (high)  High  Low 
Germany  Yes (low)  Yes (medium)  Yes (high)  Yes (high)  Low  Low 











Medium   High  




Yes (high)  Yes (high)  Yes (high)  Yes (high)  Medium  Low  
Korea
e  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Medium/high  Medium  
Mexico  Yes (high)  Yes (high)  Yes (high)  Yes (high)  High   High  
Netherlands
 e  Yes (medium)  Not explicitly (low)  Not explicitly 
(medium) 
Not explicitly (low)  Low   Low  
Norway   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Medium  Low  
Poland   Yes (low)  Yes  
(gender: high) 
(ethnicity: low) 
No   Yes  
(gender: high) 
(ethnicity: low) 
Medium/high  High  




No   No   No   No   High  EB not yet 
operational 




Yes (high)  Yes (medium)  Yes (high)  Yes (medium)  Low   Medium  
United 
Kingdom 
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Medium  Medium  
United  States 
(FL) 
Yes (medium)  No   Publication of 
guidance 
documents 
Yes (high)  Low  Low  
FL: information reported in the above table refers to Federal Laws; EB: equality body. 
a) Whenever no distinction is made between gender and ethnic grounds, answers cover both. 
b) Annotations in parentheses refer to the level of priority attributed by the body in charge of implementing the specified task. High, 
medium  and  low,  respectively,  mean  above,  close  to  and  below-average  importance  of  the  specified  task  in  the  actual  overall 
workload of the corresponding body. 
c) High, medium and low, respectively, refer to a situation where the core legal framework to ban discrimination in the labour market 
is built: on both specific legislation and general laws or codes (be they labour, civil or penal codes, employment acts or constitutional 
laws);  on  a  combination  of  anti-discrimination  laws  covering  specific  areas  (e.g.  equal  pay,  working  condition,  etc.)  or  grounds 
(gender, ethnicity); on a single, comprehensive anti-discrimination law (covering all grounds). 
d) Low, medium and high, respectively, refer to a situation where the responsibilities attached to the promotion and enforcement of 
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e) Country notes: 
Japan: there is no specific anti-discrimination legislation covering racial/ethnic minorities. For this reason, discrimination on ethnic or 
racial grounds is not covered in the analysis conducted for the purpose of this chapter, although some legal provisions exist that in 
principle allow workers to bring a discrimination case before the courts. 
Korea:  complexity  of  the  institutional  framework:  While  there  is  a  single  equality  body,  the  latter  is  not  really  specialised  in 
discrimination issues. Rather, the National Human Rights Commission aims at securing human rights in general, which tends to make 
its role on discrimination cases per se less visible (at least compared to a situation where there is a unique equality body dealing with 
discrimination cases only). 
Netherlands:  equal  Treatment  bodies  have  no  explicit  role  on  information  campaigns,  publication  of  statistics  or  code  of  good 
practices for employers, but the government does have these goals and tries to reach them actively. 
Spain: there is no specific anti-discrimination legislation covering racial/ethnic minorities. For this reason, discrimination on ethnic or 
racial grounds is not covered in the analysis conducted for the purpose of this chapter, although some legal provisions exist that in 
principle allow workers to bring a discrimination case before the courts. 
Switzerland: there is no specific anti-discrimination legislation covering racial/ethnic minorities. For this reason, discrimination on 
ethnic or racial grounds is not covered in the analysis conducted for the purpose of this chapter, although some legal provisions exist 
that in principle allow workers to bring a discrimination case before the courts. Moreover, the Federal Commission against Racism 
and the Service for Combating Racism may offer guidance and counselling to victims of discrimination. More specific equality bodies 
can be found in a small number of cantons. 
Source: See OECD (2008c). 
… although the social acceptance of the principle of equal treatment seems well established 
The general effects of the legislation may be indirect and even a vague knowledge of legal rules may 
help change people’s behaviour and contribute to the social acceptance of the principle of equal treatment 
and the idea that discrimination should not be allowed (Havinga, 2002; Phillips et al., 2007). Likewise, 
discrimination cases and their court outcomes, even if there are very few, might be an important vehicle of 
cultural change, if they are well enough publicised. 
In most countries, national equality bodies disseminate information and statistics that help raise public 
awareness  of  discrimination,  in  general,  and  of  its  concrete  manifestation  in  the  workplace,  and  run 
information campaigns to change public opinion (Table 3.2). In addition, as noted by Phillips et al., (2007), 
supplying data on the composition of the local population (i.e. ethnicity, gender, age, qualifications and 
skills, employment by group, etc.) may give employers the means of asking and answering questions about 
their  own  performance.  But  in  this  respect,  most  European  countries  are  confronted  by  a  paradox  as 
regards  statistics  related  to  ethnic  minorities.  On  the  one  hand,  collecting  and  using  data  considered 
sensitive, such as concerning racial or ethnic origins, are subject to particular restrictions, in part because 
the use of such data could entail the risk of discriminatory practices (see also OECD, 2007c). On the other 
hand, this prevents a comprehensive  assessment of the situation, which in turn is likely to impair the 
effectiveness of equality policies, as the progress made and the actions remaining to be taken cannot be 
clearly identified by the relevant authorities, citizens and individual employers. 
Overall, the idea that unequal treatment may arise at the workplace is relatively widespread among the 
population and there is strong public support for corrective measures (Figure 3.8). On average over the 
19 European countries where such information is available, almost half of the population states that a 
woman  would be  less  likely  than  a man,  with equivalent qualifications  or  diplomas,  to  get  a  job,  be 
accepted for training or be promoted. When it comes to ethnic minorities, this proportion rises to 60%. And 
in both cases, the adoption of specific measures to provide equal opportunities in the field of employment 
is supported by a large majority of public opinion (except in Denmark). While discrimination against 
ethnic minorities is seen as being more prevalent than unequal treatment on the basis of gender (in all 
countries  except  in  Finland),  public  support  for  corrective  measures  on  the  basis  of  ethnic  origin  is 
significantly lower – by 10 percentage points on average – than for policies to address gender disparities. 
This might reflect some failure in communication actions, as underlined above, and/or the difference in 
size  between  the  two  targeted  populations.  It  can  also  explain  why  legislation  is  sometimes  more 
favourable to the rights of victims in the case of discrimination on the ground of gender than on the ground 










































Figure 3.8. Public awareness about discrimination in the workplace and support for equality policies  
in selected European countries 
A. Perceived chances of employment, training and promotion














A woman compared to a man




















a) Share of persons answering "Less likely" to the question (Q7) "Would you say that, with equivalent qualifications or diplomas, the 
following people would be less likely, as likely or more likely than others to get a job, be accepted for training or be promoted". For 
“woman  compared  to  man”  and  for  “persons  of  different  ethnic  origin  or  not  white  compared  to  the  rest  of  the  population”, 
respectively, 5% and 3% of respondents answered "More likely". 
b) Share of persons answering "In favour" to the question (Q9) "Would you be in favour of, or opposed to, specific measures being 
adopted to provide equal opportunities for everyone in the field of employment?” Specific measures for people depending on “gender” 
and “ethnic origin”, respectively. 
Source: European Commission (2007b). 
3.2.  Worker incentives to bring a case before courts 
For legal rules to be effective, individuals should take action to enforce their rights. To encourage this, 
both the legal and institutional framework should provide them with the right incentives. At the very least, 
it should be possible for victims of discrimination to obtain redress and compensatory damages from the 
courts. 
Bringing a discrimination case before the courts is a costly process… 
In this respect, the burden of proof required to support a discrimination claim before the courts is of 
central importance. The issue is not straightforward: on the one hand, if the obstacles to bringing evidence 
are  so  great  that  an  action  before  courts  is  doomed  to  failure,  individual  legal  rights  are  not  really 
enforceable in practice; on the other hand, it should not be possible to bring a case before courts merely on 
the  basis  of  gender  or  ethnic  origin  each  time  a  treatment  is  felt  to  be  unfair,  otherwise  the  overall 
framework would be unsustainable. 
Following the European directives passed in the early 2000s, virtually all European countries have 
lowered the burden of proof for the plaintiff in discrimination cases – the so-called “shift burden of proof” 
(Table 3.3). Basically, the plaintiff has to provide proofs of differential treatment, and prima facie evidence 
of the link between the latter and the protected ground (e.g. gender or ethnic origin). In other words, the 
plaintiff is not required to prove discriminatory intents or practices per se, but has to present facts from 
which  a  connection  between  the  differential  treatment  and  the  protected  ground  can  be  directly  or 
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differential treatment  was  disconnected  from  any  discriminatory  intents  or  practices.  There  are  strong 
rationales for this adjustment of the burden of proof. Indeed, proving that the motivation underlying a 
difference in treatment is not discriminatory, but entirely caused by legitimate factors, should be relatively 
straightforward for the employer, while being extremely difficult for a complainant (Freedman, 2002). The 
evidence necessary for proving motivation is likely to be in the possession of the respondent rather than the 
complainant, and therefore a court might reasonably expect full and cogent explanations about why a 
particular person is, or is not appointed or promoted, disciplined or dismissed, etc. These are all matters 
which are firmly within the knowledge and control of the employer organisation and the managers and 
staff who took the particular decisions (Rayner, 2007). However, in the absence of further legal guidance 










































Box 3.5. More legal guidance or support in gathering evidence of discrimination would be useful 
In most countries, there is no clear legal guidance on what could constitute an element of proof or prima facie 
evidence of discrimination, and no clear legal support on how to gather such evidence (see OECD, 2008c). In this 
respect, the British questionnaire procedure is an interesting exception. A complainant  can  under the British anti-
discrimination legislation  ask an  alleged  discriminator for answers to specific questions set out in  a  questionnaire 
format. First, information received from the employer in response to the questionnaire can aid a decision whether or 
not to bring the case before the Employment Tribunal (ET). Second, in the event of an ET proceeding, the information, 
statistics and documents gathered from the questionnaire procedure can be used as evidence and may influence the 
ET’s final decision. If it appears to a tribunal that the respondent deliberately and without reasonable excuse omitted to 
reply to the questionnaire or that the reply is evasive or equivocal, the ET can draw adverse inferences from that 
reluctance to co-operate. This key principle is clearly set out in the anti-discrimination legislation itself. The effective 
use of questionnaire procedures plays an important part in many discrimination claims. This is a method to apply 
pressure  to  the respondent  due  to  the  rules  about responding  correctly  to  the  request and  may  lead to an  early 
settlement (Lewis, 2008). 
Situational tests and statistical evidence are other instruments that can be used to establish proofs or at least 
prima facie evidence of discrimination before the courts. While strongly advocated by experts in the anti-discrimination 
field (see for instance, Niessen, 2003), their effective use is still rather limited in a number of countries. Situational tests 
(see Box 3.2) may be especially useful in case of discriminatory hiring practices, where most often, the absence of 
clearly identified comparators makes it particularly difficult to gather evidence of discrimination. In most countries, 
situational tests are admissible before the courts, or at least not prohibited or restricted by law, but rarely used in 
practice (see OECD, 2008c). In fact, the evaluation of the admissibility of situational tests may be difficult due to the 
risks of abuse or manipulation which they may give rise to, and would require some legal guidance that at present 
does not really exist. For instance, the relevance of any situational test depends crucially on the exact comparability of 
the potentially discriminated workers and their comparators, in terms of both curriculum vitae and behavioural attitudes 
during the test. Thus, to have a legal value, situational tests would need to be closely monitored by legal authorities or 
other relevant bodies (De Schutter, 2003). Likewise, statistical evidence may be crucial for proving or establishing facts 
from which indirect discrimination can be inferred. Indirect discrimination indeed refers to a situation where the use of 
an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice (which cannot be objectively justified by a legitimate aim) puts 
some individuals, on the basis of their sex or ethnic origin, at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons. 
Complainants thus need to establish the adverse impact of the above-mentioned provision, criterion or practice on a 
group,  and  statistical  evidence  may  be  particularly  relevant  in  that  case.  But  when  it  comes  to  racial  or  ethnic 
discrimination,  the  use  of  this  kind  of  evidence  is  rather  restricted  in  most  European  countries,  by  legal  rules 
themselves. As a result, with the notable exceptions of Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
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Table 3.3. Worker incentives to bring a case before courts
a 
  Elements of 
proof to be 
provided by the 
plaintiff
b 
Institutional (free) support provided 
to the plaintiff 





















Plaintiff  Witnesses 
Australia (FL)  Proof  EB, U, NGO  EB  U, NGO  Case-by-
case basis 
Yes, no clear 
legal guidance. 
In recent case 
law, more than 
AUD 10 000. 
Yes  Yes 
Austria
f (FL)  Strong 
presumption 




amounts set by 
law, no cap 
Yes  Yes 
Belgium (FL)  Presumption  EB, U, NGO  Gender: no 
Ethnicity: EB 
EB, U, NGO  Yes  Max 3 to 
6 month’s 
salary 
Yes  Yes 
Canada (FL)  Proof  EB, U, NGO  EB  U, NGO  Case-by-
case basis 
Max 
CAD 20 000 
(plus 
CAD 20 000 in 
some cases) 





U, NGO  Labour 
inspectorate 
U, NGO  Yes   Yes, no clear 
legal guidance. 
Limited   No  
Denmark













DKK 10 000 
and 
DKK 100 000 
Limited  Limited 
Finland




U, NGO  No  Gender: min 
EUR 3 000, 
mainly no cap 
Ethnicity: max 









France  Presumption  EB, U, NGO  None  U, NGO  Yes  Yes, no clear 
legal guidance 
Limited  Limited 
Germany
f  Presumption  EB, U, NGO  None  U, NGO  Yes  Yes, limited 
legal guidance 
Yes  Yes 
Greece  Presumption  EB, U, NGO  Labour 
inspectorate 
U, NGO  Yes  Yes, no clear 
legal guidance 
Yes  Yes 
Italy
f  Gender: strong 
presumption 
Ethnicity: proof 

















Proof  EB  EB  None  Case-by-
case basis 
Yes, no clear 
legal guidance 
Yes  No 
Korea
f  Gender: 
presumption 
Ethnicity: proof 
EB, U, NGO  EB  U, NGO  Yes  Not in all cases, 















EB, U, NGO 
Yes  None  Limited  Limited 
Netherlands
f  Presumption  EB, U, NGO  EB  U, NGO  Yes  Not in all cases, 
no clear legal 
guidance 
Limited  Limited 
Norway   Presumption  EB, U, NGO  EB  U, NGO  Case-by-
case basis 
Yes, no clear 
legal guidance 
Yes  Yes 
Poland   Presumption  EB, U, NGO  Labour 
inspectorate 
U, NGO  Yes   Yes, at least 
monthly 
minimum wage  










































Portugal  Presumption  U, NGO  Labour 
inspectorate, 
mainly 
U, NGO  Yes  Yes, no clear 
legal guidance 






U, NGO  Labour 
inspectorate 
U, NGO  Yes, without 
alternative 
option 
Yes, no clear 
legal guidance 
Yes  No 
Sweden  Presumption  EB, U, NGO  EB  EB, U, NGO  Yes  6 to 32 month’s 





Yes  Yes 
Switzerland 
(gender only) 
Presumption  EB, U, NGO  EB 
(with limited 
powers) 
U, NGO  In some 
cases 
Max 3 to 
6 month’s 
salary in lieu of 
reinstatement 
Limited   Limited  
United 
Kingdom 









In 2005/06 (ET), 
Gender: average 
of GBP 10 807 
(median: 
GBP 5 546) 
Ethnicity: 
average of 
GBP 30 361 
(median: 
GBP 6 640) 
Yes   Yes  
United  States 
(FL) 
Proof  EB, U, NGO  EB  EB, U, NGO  Case-by-
case basis 
USD 50 000 
max to 
USD 300 000 
max, depending 
on firm size 
Yes  Yes 
FL: information reported in the above table refers to Federal Laws. 
a) Whenever no distinction is made between gender and ethnic grounds, answers cover both. 
b) (Strong) presumption of discrimination and proof of discrimination, respectively, refer to a situation where the employee has to 
introduce his/her claim before court by presenting: facts establishing disparate treatment and from which a (strong) presumption of 
discrimination can be inferred; and facts that prove discrimination. 
c) EB, U and NGO, respectively, mean that legal assistance and counselling and/or legal representation can be provided by: the 
equality  body,  unions  and  any  non-governmental  associations  or  public  interest  bodies  that  advocate  for  the  elimination  of 
discrimination. 
d) Investigation  procedures conducted by equality  (or other relevant) bodies in order  to gather prima facie evidence or proof of 
discrimination.  
e) “Limited” protection against victimisation/retaliation refers to: cases where the claimant employee, or any employees providing 
evidence or participating as a witness in a proceeding against discrimination, are protected against wrongful discharge only; or cases 
where the standard of proof as regards victimisation is more demanding than for “simple” discrimination. 
f) Country notes: 
Austria: elements of proof to be provided by the plaintiff: The amended Equal Treatment Act lowers the burden of proof for the plaintiff 
without completely switching it over to the respondent, when the plaintiff established facts from which it may be presumed that there 
has been direct or indirect discrimination. The law states that the respondent has to prove that “it is more likely that a different motive 
– documented by facts established by the respondent – was the crucial factor in the case or that there has been a legal ground of 
justification”. Additional  monetary  compensation: minimum  of  1  month  salary  if  the job  applicant would  have  been  awarded  the 
position, had the selection not be discriminatory; income differential for at least 3 months if the employee would have been promoted, 
had the selection not be discriminatory. There is an amendment to the law in the parliament which intends higher compensation. 
Denmark: elements of proof to be provided by the plaintiff: Although anti-discrimination laws appear to provide for a shift of the burden 
of the proof in the case of facts from which discrimination can be presumed, case law on ethnic discrimination cases shows that 
written statements from the respondent might not suffice to shift it in practice. 
Finland:  additional  monetary  compensation  –  gender:  in cases concerning  employee  recruitment  the  maximum compensation  is 
€15,000. 
Germany:  legal  representation:  Unions  and  NGOs  can  legally  represent  a  plaintiff  only  in  proceedings  where  the  law  does  not 
explicitly require a professional lawyer. NGOs are subject to certain requirements. 
Italy: elements of proof to be provided by the plaintiff: For gender: the legislation refers to well-founded evidence to shift the burden of 
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Law, discrimination cases do not require that the plaintiff is assisted by a professional lawyer. Victimisation: It is mentioned in the law 
only as regards ethnicity and only as an aggravating element when evaluating damages. 
Japan: institutional (free) support provided to the plaintiff: the EB is not directly engaged in discrimination cases brought by workers. 
Korea:  monetary  compensation: as  regards  gender,  the  anti-discrimination  law  does  not  explicitly  provide for  remedies such  as 
reinstatement or monetary compensation, but the Labour Standards Act provides for them. And there are many judicial practices and 
court rulings regarding dismissals; as regards ethnicity, no clear legal guidance in the anti-discrimination legislation, and there are no 
anti-discrimination provision in the Labour Standards Act protecting racial or ethnic minorities. 
Mexico: legal assistance and representation: As part of the general framework for labour dispute resolution, all workers have the right 
to receive free legal assistance from the Federal Public Labour Defender’s Office, when needing help to resolve labour disputes, 
including disputes caused by on-the-job discrimination based on ethnic or national origin, sex, social status, health, religion, political 
opinions or affiliation, sexual preference, or marital status. 
Netherlands: monetary compensation: The equal treatment legislation hardly mentions any sanctions and remedies, except in case of 
discriminatory dismissal. Thus, victims have to know which sanctions normal civil law and administrative law contains. 
Spain: elements of proof to be provided by the plaintiff: The legislation refers to well-founded evidence. The Constitutional Court has 
been establishing case law on the burden of proof. In order to use the rule of distribution for the burden of proof, it is necessary that 
the actor accredit “the existence of an indication that generates a reasonable suspicion, appearance or presumption in favour of 
similar affirmation; it is necessary on the part of the actor to contribute “realistic proof’” (STC 207/2001); and in another judgment 
(STC 308/2000) it indicates the “requirement for a principle of proof revealing the existence of a general discriminatory panorama or 
of facts that the vehement suspicion appears of discrimination …”. 
Source: See OECD (2008c). 
National  equality  bodies  also  play  a  key  role  in  lowering  the  threshold  of  a  discrimination  case 
(Niessen and Cormack, 2004). In virtually all countries, plaintiffs may receive free legal guidance and 
counselling from either national equality bodies, NGOs, trade unions (usually provided to members only) 
or  other  relevant  bodies  (Table 3.3).  In  most  countries,  national  equality  bodies  are  empowered  to 
investigate discrimination claims and have the legal authority to compel people (and in particular, the 
employer) to provide all of information it requires to investigate the claim. In this respect, they play a very 
specific role compared with NGOs and trade unions that usually do not have this investigative power. 
Investigation procedures are likely to be decisive in providing proofs or evidence that will enable a prima 
facie case for discrimination to be constructed. However, whether this investigative power is effectively 
binding  for  employers  and  potential  witnesses  remains  unclear  in  practice  (see  OECD,  2008c).  For 
instance, the extent to which an employer’s failure to provide the requested information can be used to 
draw  inferences  on  discrimination  if  the  case  is  brought  before  the  courts  is  rather  unclear  in  many 
countries, and only few countries report that noncompliance is sanctioned with fines (namely, Australia, 
Canada, Korea and Norway). Strikingly, in virtually all countries where the burden of proof entirely rests 
on the plaintiff, equality bodies tend to be empowered with a relatively strong investigative power: in 
Australia and Canada, anti-discrimination laws clearly specify fines for failure to comply with requests for 
information or document (in Australia, prison sentences for providing false or misleading information are 
also provided for), and in the United States, the federal equality body has a subpoena power to compel 
enforcement of a request for information. Thus, establishing a discrimination case before courts may not be 
more difficult in these countries than in countries with less  stringent systems of proof, but where the 
equality body has more limited investigative powers (O’ Hare, 2001). 
In the Czech Republic, Finland (as regards racial discrimination cases), Mexico, Poland, Portugal and 
Spain,  investigative  procedures  are  mainly  conducted  by  labour  inspectorates,  which  also  have  strong 
powers. This, however, means that there is no one-stop shop where claimants can access information, 
lodge a complaint, and receive support for gathering the requested evidence to enable a discrimination case 
to be brought before the courts. Thus, for the overall framework to be effective, labour inspectorates and 
equality bodies (or other relevant bodies) need to be well coordinated and to operate in close collaboration. 
In practice, this may be not always the case. For instance, Malheiros (2007) suggests that in Portugal, the 
main practical difficulties in enforcing legislation relate to the lack of coordination between the different 










































procedures  tend  to  be  very  protracted,  thus  creating  a  gap  between  legislation  and  its  practical 
implementation, with very few cases brought before the courts. 
Equality  bodies  are  generally  not  empowered  to  provide  plaintiffs  with  legal  representation 
(Table 3.3). And in countries where they have such a power (Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the United States as well as, as regards gender discrimination cases only, Belgium, Denmark and Italy), 
legal representation is not provided in a systematic way. In the United Kingdom for instance, the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission will take legal action, on behalf of individuals, where there are strategic 
opportunities to push the boundaries of the law, that is where there are chances to create legal precedents or 
to  clarify  and  improve  the  law.  Similarly,  in  the  United States,  the  Equal  Employment  Opportunity 
Commission litigates on behalf of the public interest, which in practice provides legal representation to 
claimants, but in a limited number of cases. Overall, the first aim of free legal representation provided by 
equality bodies, NGOs or trade unions is often to serve the public interest, and in most private, individual 
cases, lodging a discrimination claim before the courts remains an expensive procedure.
32 
… while potential benefits remain uncertain for individual victims of discrimination 
While costs are likely to be very high, benefits are uncertain in many cases: legal guidelines covering 
compensations are often not clearly specified in anti-discrimination laws (Table 3.3). As a result, for most 
countries  under  review,  it  is  not  possible  to  provide  a  single  indication  of  monetary  compensations 
awarded by the courts in discrimination cases, neither in terms of floors or caps, nor in terms of average or 
median amounts (see OECD, 2008c). In a number of cases, monetary compensations are defined through 
normal civil, administrative or penal laws, or in the labour code. To evaluate the costs and benefits of 
taking a legal action, victims of discrimination have to understands the provisions of these various laws 
and codes, a difficult task that is likely to restrain them from filing a claim (Holmaat, 2007; Malheiros, 
2007).  Overall,  compensatory  damages  (established  by  law  or  case  law),  both  well-identified  and 
potentially substantial, only exist in a few countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  United States.  Such  provisions  may  have  a  sizeable  impact  on  workers’ 
incentives to bring a discrimination case before the courts. For instance, Donohue and Siegelman (2005) 
show  that  in  the  United States,  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1991,  which  introduced  additional  statutory 
provisions for compensatory damages (for psychological distress) and more frequent access to jury trials, 
has generated more lawsuits and larger awards, even though the underlying phenomenon of workplace 
discrimination may have actually been declining. 
Although reinstatement or redress with back pay is possible in virtually all countries, whether such an 
option may constitute an effective remedy is not obvious. Bringing a discrimination claim before the courts 
is likely to deteriorate the employment relationship, so that the latter can hardly continue. In Austria for 
instance, where in cases of unlawful dismissal reinstatement is ordered without the option to accept the 
termination and claim non-pecuniary damages, Schindlauer (2007) stresses that, as many victims refuse to 
go back to a discriminatory employer, there is, in practice, neither effective remedies nor sanctions for such 
discriminatory acts.
 33 
The risk of retaliation has to be addressed 
From being a victim of discrimination one may also become a victim of retaliation for having filed a 
complaint,  which  may  constitute  a  serious  barrier  in  enforcing  anti-discrimination  legislation.  And 
                                                       
32.  In a number of countries, however, there exist simplified procedures for conflict resolutions that do not 
require the presence of a lawyer (see Section 3.4). 
33.  There is an amendment to the law in Parliament which intends, in case of unlawful dismissal, to make it 
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employer  victimisation  in  discrimination  cases  is  not  uncommon.  In  the  United States,  for  instance, 
retaliation  claims  accounted  for  about  30%  of  all  discrimination  charges  received  by  the  Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission in 2007 (EEOC, 2008). To take another example, Havinga (2002) 
reports, from a telephone survey conducted in the Netherlands, that according to the complainants, 60% of 
the employers may react negatively to a discrimination claim. More than half of the employees who filed a 
discrimination complaint had changed jobs in the meantime and 60% of these changes were related to the 
complaint. About one-third of the complainants still working with their employer did experience negative 
consequences in their job. Furthermore, the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission itself points out that key 
witnesses regularly refuse to testify for fear of negative repercussions, thus unintentionally denying the 
plaintiff the full protection of equal treatment and non-discrimination law (CGB, 2004).  
In  virtually  all  countries,  legal  provisions  protecting  individuals  from  victimisation  have  been 
introduced in anti-discrimination laws (Table 3.3). In most cases, these provisions also cover witnesses and 
other  employees  who  may  give  evidence  or  documents  in  connection  with  any  proceedings  against 
discrimination. Still, the perspective of possible employer retaliation may remain dissuasive. First, as a 
general matter of fact, gathering evidence that would enable a victimisation case before the courts may be 
difficult, and second, for victims of discrimination, this may lead to protracted legal procedures that they 
cannot always afford. As a minimum requirement, therefore, it is important that victimisation complaints 
receive the same favourable treatment which discrimination complaints are entitled to, as regards standard 
of proof and legal proceedings, rather than the treatment normally reserved to standard civil disputes. 
3.3.  Employer  incentives  to  comply  with  anti-discrimination  legislation  and  follow  an  equality 
policy 
Taking a legal action can be a costly, complex, time-consuming and represents an adversarial process 
for victims of discrimination in the workplace. Anti-discrimination laws generally will have more impact if 
the  enforcement  is  not  exclusively  dependent  on  the  initiative  of  individuals  deprived  of  their  rights. 
Enforcement by specific agencies can thus play an important role. In this respect, Liggett (1969) shows for 
instance that in the United States, before the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (the federal 
anti-discrimination  legislation)  in 1964,  the  establishment  of  so-called  fair  employment  practices 
commissions (FEPC) helped improve the labour market situation of Black workers in states where such 
commissions were empowered to conduct formal investigations and follow-up reviews. In states where 
FEPCs had only purely advisory functions, and even in states where FPECs could enforce their orders 
through  the  courts  but  did  not  have  the  legislative  support  or  administrative  resources  to  carry  out 
investigation and reviews, exclusion practices were more persistent. 
In  most  countries,  national  equality  bodies  (or  other  relevant  bodies)  are  empowered  to  conduct 
formal investigations, on their own initiative and behalf, either randomly or in companies and organisations 
where there is evidence of discrimination, and to take legal actions when deemed necessary (Table 3.4). 
While not  directly  supporting  current  individual  victims of discrimination,  such  actions  may raise the 
profile of equality issues, establish the value of eliminating discrimination and change people’s behaviour, 
thus  indirectly  helping  all  potential  victims  of  discrimination.  However,  to  have  an  impact,  this 
investigative  activity  needs  to  be  associated  with  effective  and  proportionate  sanctions  against 
discriminatory employers (Table 3.4). Publicity of discrimination cases may play a key role in this respect, 
and such sanctions are available in most countries. Likewise, administrative sanctions, such as withdrawal 
of public subsidies or other benefits, cancellation of public contracts and temporary ineligibility to compete 
for  public  contracts,  reinforce  the  view  that  the  society  as  a  whole,  and  first  and  foremost,  public 
institutions, should ban discriminatory practices and promote the principle of equal treatment. But such 











































34 Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. Other available sanctions are fines or 
prison sentences. They are likely to be less effective, since they often are of a penal nature, and thus only 
enforceable through penal procedures with highly restrictive standards of proofs. Only Greece, Mexico, 
Portugal and Spain have highly dissuasive administrative fines. Finally, the overall procedure is likely to 
be more effective, or at least less time-consuming, when administrative sanctions can be imposed directly 
by equality bodies (or equivalent bodies) themselves, as in Finland (as regards gender discrimination cases 
only), France, Norway, Portugal and the United States. 
Table 3.4. Employer incentives to comply with anti-discrimination legislation and follow an equality policy
a 
  Is the EB 
empowered to 
take legal 




Sanctions in case of non-compliance  Affirmative and positive 
action 
Publicity
c  Administrative, 
civil or penal fines 





Allowed  Incentives 
Australia 
(FL) 
No   Yes   Penal 
AUD 10 000 max 
None  Yes 
(3 months max) 
Yes   Legal requirements, 
delivery of labels. 
Financial support 
(ethnicity only) 




None  Yes  Delivery of labels, 
financial support 
Belgium (FL)  Yes  
(gender: low, 
ethnicity: high) 
Yes  Gender: none 
Ethnicity: penal, 
low 
None  Gender: none 
Ethnicity: 
1 to 12 months 
Yes  Delivery of labels, 
financial support 
Canada







No   Administrative 
EUR 31 900 max  
None   None   Yes  None  
Denmark
d  No  No  Penal, approx. 
DKK 1 000, 
for discriminatory 
job ads 
None  None  No, in 
general 
None 








(6 months max) 
Yes  Gender: legal 
requirements, 
delivery of labels 
France  Yes (low)  Yes  Penal, 
EUR 45 000 max 
EB empowered to 
imposed fines 
Yes 
(3 years max) 
Yes  Delivery of labels 
Germany
d  No  Yes  Administrative 
and penal, rare 
None  None  Yes  Counselling 









Gender: no cap 





(6 months min) 
Yes  Gender: delivery of 
labels, financial 
support 
Italy  Yes (low)  Yes  Gender: 
administrative, 
low, never applied 
Ethnicity: no 
Gender: withdrawal 
of state benefits, 
never applied 
Ethnicity: no 









Yes (high)  Yes, in 
some cases 
Penal, in some 
cases 
(JPY 300 000 
max) 
None  Yes, in some 
cases 
(6 months max) 
Yes  Delivery of labels, 
counselling and 
other assistance 
                                                       
34.  In Italy, however, these sanctions are envisaged only for the most serious breach of the prohibition to 












































d  No  Yes  Penal 
gender: max 5 to 
KRW 30 million 
None  Yes 
(gender: 5 
years max) 
Yes  Delivery of labels, 
administrative and 
financial support 
Mexico  Yes (high)  Yes  Labour law, 
3 to 315 times the 
daily minimum 
wage 
None  Yes 
(3 days to one 
year) 
Yes  Delivery of labels, 
financial support 
Netherlands  Yes (low)  Yes 
(EB only) 
Penal, 
EUR 6 700 max 
None  Yes 
(max of 2 or 
6 months) 
Yes  Counselling and 
other assistance 





(3 years max) 
Yes  None 
Poland   Yes   No   Penal 
Vary between 
EUR 300 and 
EUR 200 000 max 
None   Yes 
(3 years max) 
Yes   Gender: delivery of 
labels and financial 
support 
Portugal
d  No  Yes  Administrative. 
Clearly specified in 
the Labour Code, 
vary from 
EUR 1 780 to 
EUR 53 400, 
according to the 
degree of fault, 




empowered to order 
the removal of 
benefits granted by 
public bodies or 
services, and the 
removal of the right 
to participate in trade 
fairs and public 
markets. 





No  Yes  Administrative. 
Vary according to 
the degree of fault 
from EUR 3 000 to 
EUR 90 000. 
Possible removal of 
tax relief, subsidies 





(6 months to 
2 years) 
Yes  Requirement of 
gender equality 
plan in large 
companies (with 
numerical goals), 
delivery of labels, 
financial incentives 
Sweden








None   Yes   Financial support 
United 
Kingdom 












or discontinuance of 
Federal financial 
assistance 
None  Yes  Legal 
requirements for 
public contractors, 
“Awards” for best 
practices 
FL: information reported in the above table refers to Federal Laws; EB: equality bodies. 
a) Whenever no distinction is made between gender and ethnic grounds, answers cover both. 
b) That is, the body in question can take legal action against companies or organisations that apply discriminatory practices, even if 
no specific victim is referred to (in which case the consent of a victim is not required). Annotations in parentheses refer to the level of 
priority attributed by the body in charge of implementing the specified task. High, medium and low, respectively, mean above, close to 
and below-average importance of the specified task in the actual overall workload of the corresponding body. 
c) Publicity means that courts (or other relevant bodies) can order the nominative publication/publicity of a discrimination case, and/or 
send a notice outside the firm in question (media, trade unions, etc.). 
d) Country notes: 
Canada: Fines – Remedial legislation as opposed to penal. There is, however, a penalty provision, a fine not exceeding CAD 50 000, 
in case of victimisation/retaliation as well as for a person obstructing an investigator or a member or panel of the Tribunal in carrying 










































Equity  Act  that  applies  to  the  federal  public  sector  and  to  federally-regulated  private  sector  companies,  and  the  Quebec  Act 
respecting  equal  access to  employment  in  public  bodies  that  applies to the  Quebec  public sector  only.  These two  Acts  require 
employers  to  make  regular  public  reports  on  employment  composition  and  to  take  positive  action  to  promote  employment  of 
disadvantaged groups. They cover only about 10% of Canadian workers, however. 
Denmark: Positive actions –  Positive  actions  allowed  only  in  projects  with  public  authorization.  Gender  preferential  treatment  is 
allowed in the case of training if that gender is under-represented. 
Germany: Publicity – Due to privacy rules, publicity is likely to be limited to official court documents (MIPEX, 2007). Incentives: most 
of the activity related to incentives for the private sector is limited to counselling firms on how to comply with requirement of the anti-
discrimination law. 
Japan: Publicity – In the event that an employer is in violation of any of the provisions contained is this Law regarding the prohibition 
to discriminate and the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare has given a recommendation, but the employer has not complied with 
it, the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare may make a public announcement to that effect. 
Korea: Prison sentence – gender: imprisonment of five years or less or a penalty of KRW 30 million or less in case of violation of the 
equal wage provision (for work of equal value in the same business). Affirmative and positive actions – gender: Affirmative action 
(employment  improvement  measures)  is  generally  allowed,  and  government-invested  institutions,  subsidiary  organisations  of 
government, and companies with 500 workers or more are required to implement affirmative action. National and local governments 
can provide administrative and financial incentives to firms with good records in affirmative action. 
Portugal: Other civil or administrative sanctions – In addition, the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (the EB) 
may also apply the following ancillary sanctions: publication of the decision; public admonition of the perpetrators of discriminatory 
practices; confiscation of property; prohibition of the exercise of a profession or activity which involves a public capacity or depends 
on authorisation or official approval by public authorities; compulsory closing of premises owned by the perpetrators; suspension of 
licences and other permits. 
Spain: Other civil or administrative sanctions – In case of direct or indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex, these sanctions may 
be replaced by the preparation and application of an equality plan in the company, if so determined by the competent labour authority 
at the request of the company and after an official report issued by the Social Security and Employment Inspection Service. Should 
the equality plan not be prepared or applied or should it be carried out in manifest breach of the terms laid down in the ruling of the 
labour authority, on the proposal of the Social Security and Employment Inspection Service, the said authority will remove the effect 
of the substitution of the penalties in question. 
Sweden:  Affirmative  and  positive  action  –  Employers  are  obliged  under  penalty  of  a  fine  to  work  for  diversity  and  to  prevent 
discrimination  on  grounds  of  gender  as  well  as  ethnicity  through  targeted  and  proactive  measures.  The  ombudsmen  against 
discrimination will supervise how the employers fulfil this obligation and have the power to enforce the work by bringing the case 
before  a  board  that  can  decide  whether  the  employer  has  done  enough  or  not.  When  it  comes  to  gender,  some  actions  are 
mandatory. The employer must, for instance, every year examine the salaries of the employees from a gender perspective in order to 
ensure equal pay for equal work. 
United States:  Is  the  EB  is  empowered  to  take  legal  action  on  its  own  initiative?  –  EEOC  (Equal  Employment  Opportunity 
Commission)  takes  legal  representation  in  about  40%  of  charges  as  to  which  the  EEOC  has  found  reasonable  cause  to  find 
discrimination and following unsuccessful conciliation of the charge. EEOC litigates on behalf of the public interest, which in effect 
provides legal representation to claimants. Affirmative and positive action: no mandatory quotas, but goals and timetables. 
Source: See OECD (2008c). 
In  addition  to  this  coercive  approach,  all  countries  allow  employers  to  take  positive  actions  and 
provide them with incentives to do so, mainly in the form of labels publicising company good practices 
(Table 3.4). While in some countries (Australia, Finland, Norway, Spain and the United States), employers 
are  legally  required  to  implement  specific  and  well-defined  positive  measures,  Phillips  et al.  (2007) 
underline that in many cases, the fear of contravening the existing equality laws restrains employers from 
taking  positive  actions.  First  and  foremost,  they  would  need  to  receive  clearer  legal  guidance  and 
counselling. However, this kind of support is available only in a few countries, such as Germany, Japan 
and the Netherlands. Finally, recognising that implementing positive measures may have a cost, a number 
of governments provide employers with financial support. 
More  generally,  the  downside  of  anti-discrimination  legislations  is  that  some  provisions  may 
discourage employers from hiring disadvantaged groups in the first place. Affirmative and positive action 
policies  can  provide  appropriate  incentives  to  prevent  this.  For  instance,  the  fact  that  employers’ 
obligations as regards maternity leave – which may have a cost, at least in the short run – tend to have a 
detrimental impact on the recruitment of women of child-bearing age is well documented. In other words, 
where cost is involved employers tend to feel they have a legitimate reason for discrimination (ACAS, 
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firms do not have to pay any employers’ social contributions when hiring an unemployed person, on a 
temporary contract, to replace an employee on maternity or adoption leave, or any leave during pregnancy 
or  breastfeeding.  It  is  noteworthy  however,  that  while  positive  and  affirmative  action  policies  can 
constitute a valuable complement to anti-discrimination laws, they may themselves result in distortions, 
disincentive effects or call into doubt the merit of the targeted population (see Fryer and Loury, 2005). This 
would deserve an in-depth analysis that goes beyond the scope of this chapter, which primarily focuses on 
the legal aspects of equal treatment policies. 
3.4.  Alternative resolution mechanisms: mediation and conciliation procedures 
Individual victims of discrimination face strong barriers to enforce their legal rights by bringing their 
case before the courts, in particular when they wish to continue working with their current employer. As 
underlined by ACAS in the United Kingdom, once a claim has been lodged, it can be very difficult to 
repair the employment relationship because of the adversarial nature of the litigation process. Even where 
the parties agree to settle before the actual hearing, this will often be on the basis of a termination of the 
employment relationship and compensation because of the damage that has already been done (ACAS, 
2006b). In fact, while many of the potential benefits of pursuing discrimination cases are collective, many 
of the costs of pursuing them are individual (Burstein, 1989). Consequently, most national equality bodies 
also offer what is described as “mediation” at an early stage, preferably before any legal claim has been 
made (Table 3.5). 
For both parties involved in a discrimination dispute, mediation presents several advantages (Keppler, 
2003): 
•  First, it offers the likelihood that the employment discrimination complaint might be resolved 
faster  and  cheaper.  Mediation  procedures  take  on  average  between  two  and  eight months  in 
countries  where  such  information  is  available  (Australia,  Canada,  France,  Greece,  Japan, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States, see OECD, 2008c) and are free for both parties 
since they do not require legal representation by a private lawyer. Besides, effective mediation 
procedures can also achieve considerable savings to the public purse. In the United Kingdom for 
instance, the high  resolution rate  of labour  disputes  by ACAS  considerably reduces  potential 
hearing days at Employment Tribunals (75% of potential hearing days are saved in this way). In 
addition, the cost per case settled or withdrawn through ACAS is GBP 393, while the cost per 
case heard at an Employment Tribunal is about GBP 2 000 (ACAS, 2006b). 
•  Second, the mediation’s non-adversarial setting not only increases the probability of compromise, 
but  also  reduces  the  risk  of  irreparably  damaging  the  employment  relationship.  Indeed,  in 
virtually all countries, mediation takes place on a voluntary basis, is assisted by a third neutral 
party  and  offers  the  parties  confidentiality.  By  playing  the  role  of  an  unbiased  advisor,  the 
mediator can help the parties re-evaluate unrealistic assumptions and thus bridge the gap between 
the parties’ initial positions, while the confidentiality afforded by mediation allows the parties to 
make  the  admissions  and  concessions  necessary  to  reach  a  compromise  solution.  Since  a 
mediator  is  not  a  decision  maker,  any  decision  is  left  to  the  parties,  increasing  the  parties’ 
acceptance and overall satisfaction with the outcome and providing the basis for rebuilding a 
fractured employment relationship. 
The effectiveness of mediated settlements is reduced in countries where they are not legally binding, 
such  as  Belgium,  Germany,  Greece,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal  (Table 3.5).  For  victims  of 
discrimination,  this  renders  mediation  much  less  attractive.  In  some  countries,  participation  is  not 
established on a voluntary basis and/or the equality body does not act as a fully neutral third party. This is, 










































as a semi-judicial body empowered to give an opinion on a discrimination claim, seeking to secure the 
parties’ voluntary compliance with it. This is also the case in Canada and the United States when it comes 
to the so-called conciliation procedures, where both participation is mandatory and the equality body seeks 
redress  on  the  behalf  of  the  claimant.
35  These  procedures  thus  lie  in  between  mediation  and  court 
proceedings: while the complaint may still be resolved faster and cheaper, they offer less guarantees as 
regards the possible continuation of the employment relationship. 
Available evaluations suggest that mediation procedures offer a valuable alternative for discrimination 
dispute resolutions. The Canadian Human Rights Commission began offering mediation services in 1998, 
on a pilot-project basis, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the programme (CHRC, 2000). The two-
year pilot project came to an end in the fall of 2000. During this time, mediation was offered to the parties 
in some 500 complaints.  The participation rate in the programme, i.e. the proportion of complaints in 
which  both  parties  agreed  to  participate,  was  60%.  And  settlements  were  reached  in  56%  of  cases. 
Evaluations  showed  that  the  majority  of  complainants  and  respondents  felt  that  mediation  had  been 
worthwhile  whether  or  not a settlement was reached. Mediation is now widely  used by  the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission: it represented 40% of all cases dealt with in 2006. Most of these settlements 
were reached with the assistance of a Commission mediator or conciliator. In a small number of cases, the 
parties settled the matter on their own (CHRC, 2006). The mediation programme available in the United 
States was also recently evaluated (McDermott et al., 2000). And here again, results are encouraging. The 
majority of the participants felt that the mediator understood their needs (87%) and helped to clarify their 
needs  (82%).  Most  participants  (85%)  also  felt  that  the  mediator  played  a  very  useful  role  in  the 
development of options for the resolution of the dispute and a majority (59%) were satisfied with the 
results of mediation. Overall, about 60% of the participants resolved their claims through the mediation 
programme. And among those who failed, about 30% nevertheless recognised that progress was made in 
mediation toward the resolution of their claim. 
Table 3.5. Mediation and conciliation procedures
a 





General characteristics of the mediation/conciliation 
procedure 




Intervention of, and 
guidance from, a third 
neutral party 
Confidentiality  Legally  
binding  
Enforcement 
secured by the 
relevant body 
Australia (FL)  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   No  
Austria (FL)  Not explicitly  The EB is empowered to give an opinion and seeks to 
secure the parties’ voluntary compliance with it. 
Yes   No  
Belgium (FL)  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   No   No  
Canada
b (FL)  Yes   Mediation: yes 
Conciliation: no 
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Czech Republic   No   n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Denmark
b  Yes  Gender: The EB can assist parties in finding a settlement 
through mediation 
Yes  No 
Ethnicity: yes  Ethnicity: yes  Ethnicity: yes 
Finland  Gender: not 
explicitly 
Ethnicity: no 
Gender: the EB is empowered to give an opinion and 
seeks to secure the parties’ voluntary compliance with it. 
If there is no voluntary compliance, the EB can enforce 
its decision with the threat of a penalty. 
Gender: EB 
decisions can 
only be appealed 
to the tribunal. 
Yes 
France  Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Germany  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Greece
b  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   No   No  
                                                       
35.   More precisely, in Canada, if the Canadian Human  Rights Commission chooses to order conciliation, 
participation by the claimant and the respondent is mandatory; and if both parties come to a settlement, the 
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Italy  Yes   Yes  Yes  Partly  Yes  No 
Japan 
(gender only) 
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   No  
Korea  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Mexico  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Netherlands  Not explicitly  The EB is empowered to give an opinion and shall seek 
to secure the parties’ voluntary compliance with it. 
No   No  
Norway
b   Not explicitly  The EB is empowered to give an opinion and shall seek 
to secure the parties’ voluntary compliance with it. If 
there is no voluntary compliance, the EB is empowered 
to make administrative decisions.  
EB decisions can 
only be appealed 
to the tribunal. 
Yes 
Poland   No   n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Portugal  Gender: no 
Ethnicity: yes 
Ethnicity: yes  Ethnicity: yes  No   No   No  
Spain 
(gender only) 
No   n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Sweden  Yes   Yes   Yes (EB non neutral)  No   Yes   Yes  
Switzerland 
(gender only) 
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   No  




Yes   Mediation: yes 
Conciliation: no 
Mediation: yes  
Conciliation: no 
Yes   Yes   Yes  
FL: information reported in the above table refers to Federal Laws; EB: equality bodies. 
n.a.: not applicable. 
a) Whenever no distinction is made between gender and ethnic grounds, answers cover both. 
Belgium: intervention of and guidance from a third neutral party.Ethnicity: the equality body is not a neutral party since it can bring 
cases before the courts. 
b) Country notes: 
Canada:  mediation  and  conciliation  refer  to  two  distinct  procedures.  The  main  difference  is  that  mediation  is  voluntary  while 
conciliation is mandatory. The Commission encourages use of mediation early in the complaint process, although it is available at any 
stage up to Tribunal hearings. Conciliation generally takes place after an investigation of the facts, before a case is referred to the 
Tribunal. However, the Commission can order conciliation at an earlier stage. The roles of the conciliator and the mediator are quite 
similar.  But,  unlike  mediators,  conciliators  give  direct  feedback  on  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  arguments,  opinions  and 
proposals. 
Denmark  :  the  EB  for  gender  discrimination  complaints  (Gender  Equality  Board),  in  comparative  law  terms,  lies  in  between  a 
conciliation  organisation  and  a  tribunal  with,  in  addition,  investigative  power. Without  acting  as  a  mediator,  it  can  assist  parties 
reaching a settlement agreement. If mediation fails, it has the authority to make administrative decisions, which may be appealed to 
the Tribunal. 
Greece: confidentiality:  The  settlement  process  followed  by  the  Labour  Inspectorate  is  confidential  but  the  plaintiff may  use  the 
mediation conclusions in court. 
Italy: the mediation process is regulated by the labour code, the code for civil proceedings and similar laws for disputes with the public 
administration. EBs can, however, act as mediators. 
Norway: the EB, in comparative law terms, lies in between a conciliation organisation and a tribunal with, in addition, investigative 
power. The Ombud has the authority to make administrative decisions, which may be appealed to the Tribunal. The Ombud may give 
an opinion as to whether a matter is in contravention of anti-discrimination provisions contained in the legislation. The Ombud shall 
seek to secure the parties’ voluntary compliance with this opinion. If a voluntary arrangement cannot be reached, the Ombud may 
bring the case before the Tribunal. In addition, if the parties do not voluntarily comply with the opinion of the Ombud and if waiting for 
an administrative decision by the Tribunal will cause inconvenience or have a harmful effect, the Ombud may make administrative 
decisions (that may be appealed to the Tribunal). 
United States: EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) encourages use of mediation early in the complaint process, 
although it is available at any stage up to Tribunal hearings. Conciliation generally takes place after an investigation of the facts, 
before a case is referred to the Tribunal. EEOC operates as a neutral party during mediation, but seeks remedial action on behalf of 
the claimant during conciliation. OFCCP (Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program) conciliates directly with the contractor as a 
party to secure relief on behalf of the victims. If the contractor declines to participate or the conciliation is otherwise unsuccessful, 
OFCCP  may  refer  the  matter  to  the  Department’s  Office  of  the  Solicitor.  The  Office  of  the  Solicitor  may  file  an  administrative 
complaint. 










































As  noted  by  O’Cinneide  (2002),  concerns  were  initially  expressed  that  mediation  would  allow 
individuals to achieve personal remedies without securing overall systemic change in the behaviour that 
led to their complaint. Results to date have, however, shown that mediated settlements can result in broader 
remedies, such as anti-discrimination training, a review of staff structures and pay scales. Nevertheless, the 
possibility  exists  that  extensive  use  of  mediation  could  reduce  overall  enforcement,  by  focusing  on 
individual remedies at the expense of systemic ones and preventing the establishment in case-law of clear 
precedent.  More  generally,  mediation  should  probably  be  seen  as  an  alternative  to,  but  never  as  a 
replacement of, effective enforcement through the legal system. Replacing meaningful enforcement with 
conciliation and mediation could remove the sting of the legislation: mediation will always work better 
against the background threat of litigation. 
3.5.  How effective are these anti-discrimination frameworks? 
Evaluations of national legislative efforts to ban discrimination are scarce. Having a long-standing 
experience in policy to ban discrimination compared to most other OECD countries, the United States is 
probably the only country where there are enough pieces of evidence to draw some conclusions on the 
impact of anti-discrimination legislation on race and gender differentials in labour market performance 
(Annex  Table 3.A2.2;  and  for  comprehensive  surveys,  see  Donohue  and  Heckman,  1991;  Altonji  and 
Blank, 1999; and Donohue, 2005): 
•  First, available empirical evidence shows that laws barring discrimination helped to improve the 
relative labour market situation of ethnic minorities, in terms of both earnings and employment. 
And while their impact on gender differentials is less documented, there also is some evidence 
that these laws contributed to reduce gender wage gaps and helped women to get jobs in male 
dominated occupations. 
•  Second, these effects materialised over time, through direct and indirect channels, as enforcement 
capacity and ability increased and public opinion changed. Thus, evaluating their magnitude is 
not an easy task and, to date, there is no strong consensus on this important issue (see Donohue 
and Heckman, 1991; Altonji and Blank, 1999). 
•  Third,  anti-discrimination  provisions  may  also  have  side-effects  on  the  populations  they  are 
intended to protect and need to be carefully designed. For instance, some evaluations suggest that 
early  State  legislation,  which  introduced  gender  equal  pay  provisions  without  additional 
employment  protection  (i.e.  without  nondiscrimination  provisions  regarding  hiring  and 
dismissals), widened gender employment gaps. And even when discriminatory hiring practices 
are prohibited by law, strong on-the-job protections (e.g. regarding pay and dismissal) may still 
restrain some employers from hiring protected workers in the first place (see Oyer and Schaefer, 
2002). 
Cross-country evaluations are even scarcer. Indeed, no cross-country comparable time-series of the 
degree  of  stringency  of  anti-discrimination  regulations  is  available.  To  cope  with  this  lacuna, 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) use ratifications of international conventions on discrimination 
– ILO’s Conventions on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value and 
on Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and the UN’s Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women – as proxies for domestic anti-discrimination laws,
36 and 
find a robust negative impact of this variable on the gender wage gap in their meta-analysis concerning 
OECD and non-OECD countries. 
                                                       
36.  This proxy is clearly very rough, not least because certain early adopters of stringent regulations always 
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For the purpose of this chapter, the analysis of Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) has been 
replicated on OECD  countries only and further extended to gender employment gaps, using the same 
methodology employed above for the analysis of product market regulation (see Box 3.4). Two indexes of 
ratifications of anti-discrimination conventions are developed: a qualitative index that takes value one if at 
least one convention is ratified and not denounced; and a quantitative index that counts the number of 
conventions  that  are  ratified  and  not  denounced,  and  allows  for  non-integer  scores  in  the  case  of 
reservations  concerning  labour  market  aspects  of  a  convention  (see  Annex 3.A1).  The  econometric 
estimates show that both indexes are negatively and significantly associated to the gender employment gap 
in  international  data  (Table 3.6,  Panel A),  and  in  particular  with  the  portion  of  the  gap  that  it  is  not 
accounted for by gender differences in labour supply and aggregate labour demand.
37 Taken at face value, 
ratification  of  all  three  anti-discrimination  conventions  is  associated  with  a  reduction  in  the  gender 
employment gap between 0.5 and 1.3 percentage points.
38 While these figures are relatively small, they 
probably reflect the roughness of the proxy used.
39 Similar results emerge in the case of the gender wage 
gap (Table 3.6, Panel B) where, however, as in the analysis of the impact of product market regulation, 
point estimates are larger but also less precise (see Annex 3.B, for detailed results).
40 Overall, available 
evidence  confirms  that  anti-discrimination  legislation  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  labour  market 
disparities. 
                                                       
37.  The analysis of the association between convention ratifications and the employment gap is performed on 
two unbalanced samples: an extended sample covering all countries and years for which data are available 
– including 28 countries from 1960 to 2003 (all OECD countries except Iceland and Luxembourg) – and a 
more  restricted  sample  – 21 countries  from  1975  to  2003  as  in  Section 2.3  (see  above  for  the  list  of 
countries) – where product market regulation indicators are available and a larger list of controls can be 
included. However, since most OECD countries had already ratified at least one convention by 1975, the 
analysis of the association of the qualitative index with the employment gap is not repeated in the restricted 
sample. For the same reason, due to the small number of country-by-time points before 1975 for which 
wage data are available, the analysis of wage gaps and the qualitative index is not undertaken. 
38.  Granger-causality tests suggest that this association is likely to reflect a causal impact of the adoption of 
anti-discrimination laws on the gender employment gap (see Annex 3.B). 
39.  Notice that the apparent greater estimated effect per convention of the qualitative index might be due to the 
likely lower noise to signal ratio of this index with respect to the quantitative one. 
40.  The  most  reliable  estimates  (excluding  outliers)  are  nonetheless  in  the  range  of  those  obtained  by 










































Table 3.6. Ratification of anti-discrimination conventions is associated with a lower gender employment 
and wage gaps
a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-1.15*** -1.11*** -1.17*** -1.19***
[6.80] [6.74] [6.93] [6.96]
-0.18* -0.16* -0.18** -0.20** -0.41* -0.44** -0.44*
[1.96] [1.77] [2.00] [2.12] [1.92] [2.06] [1.84]
Observations 971 971 953 953 436 436 414
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Anti-discrimination conventions 
(quantitative index) -0.071** -0.065** -0.070** -0.050** -0.044* -0.047*
[2.19] [2.02] [2.13] [2.05] [1.82] [1.94]






No control for outliers Excluding outliers









Interpretation: the table shows that i) the ratification of at least one anti-discrimination convention is estimated to reduce the gender 
employment gap by 1.1-1.2 percentage points (Panel A); and ii) the ratification of all three conventions is estimated to narrow the gap 
by 0.5-1.3 percentage points (Panel A); and iii) the ratification of all three conventions is estimated to narrow the gender wage gap by 
1.3-2.1 percentage points (Panel B). 
a) Each cell refers to a different specification. The qualitative index takes value 1 when at least one international convention on 
discrimination has been ratified and not denounced. The quantitative index varies between 0 and 3, depending on the number of 
ratified conventions that have not been denounced (adjustments are made for ratifications with reservations). 
b)  All  specifications  control  for  the  gender  labour  participation  gap  and  total  employment  rate,  include  country  dummies,  time 
dummies and country-specific time-trends and, except for those in column (1), include controls for ratification of conventions banning 
female night and underground work. Specifications in columns (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) also include the logarithm of import penetration. 
Specifications in column (4) include a control for collective bargaining conventions. Specifications in columns (5), (6) and (7) include 
product market regulation, the share of services in GDP and, except in column (5), union density. Specifications in column (7) include 
controls for EPL, tax wedge for couples, average benefit replacement rate and a dummy for high corporatism. 
c) The dependent variable is the unexplained residual reported in the different studies included in the meta-analysis. Observations 
refer  to  the  number  of  country-by-year  couples.  All  specifications  control  for  meta-variables  and  include  country  dummies,  time 
dummies and country-specific time-trends. All specifications include product market regulation. Equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) also 
include EPL. In addition, equations (3) and (6) include the (log) gender employment gap and controls for ratification of conventions 
banning female night and underground work. 
Robust t statistics in brackets: *, **, ***: statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Source: OECD estimates (see Annex 3.B, for detailed results). 
Conclusion 
Available  evidence  suggests  that  gender  and  racial  discrimination  in  the  labour  market  is  still 
significant in a number of OECD countries. The chapter mainly focuses on coercive legal approaches, as a 
tool for policy-makers to fight discrimination. It provides some evidence that such approaches can help 
improve  the  labour  market  situation  of  women  and  ethnic  minorities.  Importantly,  the  merit  of  anti-
discrimination laws resides not only in their capacity to repress unwanted behaviours and compensate 
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Anti-discrimination legislation is,  however,  only  one possible  tool  to  combat discrimination and  more 
research is needed on positive action and incentive schemes that can elicit virtuous behaviour. In addition, 
the chapter shows that increased competitive pressure on the product market has contributed to reduce 
employment and wage gaps. In this context, by proceeding further along the route of regulatory reforms, 
OECD member countries are likely to not only to strengthen productivity and growth but also to reduce 
discrimination and disparities in the labour market. 
The ways in which the institutional framework interacts with discriminatory behaviour in shaping 
their effect on employment and wage gaps deserves, however, further exploration. For instance, minimum 
wage legislation de facto reduces the scope for unequal wage treatment based on discrimination, but may 
reinforce discriminatory hiring practices. Likewise, employment protection legislation restrains employers 
from adopting discriminatory approaches as regards firings, but may have the opposite effect on the hiring 
process. To take another example, in “insider-outsiders models” discriminated groups will tend to fare less 
well in the labour market since discrimination is likely to place them in an outsider position: thus, they will 
face the same barriers to employment as any other outsider, in addition to the specific barriers they face in 
relation to discriminatory employment practices per se. More generally, discrimination might interact with 
policies designed to increase labour supply. In fact, by affecting labour market returns, discriminatory 
practices  will  discourage  labour  market  participation.  But,  anticipation  of  differential  returns  from 
educational  choices  could  also  influence  individual  incentives  to  invest  in  education  and  training,  the 
choice  of  field  of  study  and,  later  on,  the  choice  of  industries  and  occupations.  These  interaction 
mechanisms  are  potentially  important in  shaping the overall consequences  of  employer  discriminatory 
behaviours. A deeper analysis of such interactions may contribute to a better understanding of the factors 
underlying the observed wage and employment gaps, which in turn, may have important implications for 











































DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITION 
Employment and wage data in Section 1 
Employment rates: Unless otherwise specified, employment data come from the OECD database on 
Labour Force Statistics. Employment rates by educational attainment are taken from Education at a Glance 
– OECD Indicators (OECD, 2007). When necessary (Figure 3.2) adjustments were made to correct for 
minor discrepancies between the total employment rate according to the OECD databases on Education at 
a Glance and on Labour Force Statistics. 
Table 3.A1.1. Wage data (except for Figure 3.4) 
  Sources 
European 
countries 
Unless otherwise specified, data are estimated by the OECD using the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). Hourly wages refer to gross monthly earnings in the main job divided by 52/12 and then by usual 
weekly  hours  of  work  for  employees  working  for  at  least  15  hours  a  week.  Overtime  pay  and  hours  are 
included. 
Australia  Data  are  derived  from  the  August  2000  Labour  Force  Survey  and  the  supplementary  survey  “Employee 
Earnings, Benefits  and  Trade  Union  Membership”.  Average  gross  hourly  wages  are  calculated  using  total 
weekly earnings divided by actual hours worked. 
Canada  Hourly  wages  are  estimated  using  the  Cross  National Equivalent File  (CNEF).  Earnings  are  gross  annual 
labour earnings divided by annual hours worked. 
Korea  Hourly wages are estimated using the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, wave 4 (2001). For employees 
paid by the hour, they refer to gross hourly earnings. For employees paid daily, weekly or monthly, hourly 
earnings are estimated as gross weekly earnings (daily earnings are multiplied by five and monthly are divided 
by 52/12) divided by average weekly hours of work. 
New Zealand  Data are from the New  Zealand Income Survey  which is run annually  as a supplement to the Household 
Labour Force Survey in the June quarter. Data refer to the June 2001 quarter. Information on earnings includes 
actual and usual wages and salaries (including ordinary time, overtime and other income) for the main job and 
up to two other jobs. The earnings measure used in the tables is average usual hourly earnings from all wage 
and salary jobs.  
Sweden  The data were provided by Statistics Sweden based on the Statistics Yearbook of Salaries and Wages (2000). 
The data come from five different sources, three of which pertain to the public sector and cover the entire 
population; the other two sources are based on enterprise sample surveys covering the private sector. The 
wages are gross wages and include agreed bonuses but exclude overtime and profit-sharing. In the public 
sector the hourly wages were calculated by dividing the monthly wage by 165, the average worked hours per 
month. In the private sector the hourly wages were calculated by dividing the total wage by contractual worked 
hours (overtime hours are excluded).  
Switzerland  Hourly wages were calculated by the Swiss Statistical Office based on the 2001 Enquête de la Population 
Active by dividing gross annual earnings by 52 and then by usual weekly hours of work. 
United States  Hourly  wages  are  estimated  using  the  March  Outgoing  Group  of  the  Current  Population  Survey  (CPS). 
Earnings are gross annual labour earnings divided by annual hours worked. Average estimated wage gaps can 
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Table 3.A1.2.  Data for Figure 3.4 
Employment and wage gaps between “white” and “non-white” groups in Canada, 
the United Kingdom and the United States 
  Employment data  Wage data 
Canada  Data  are  limited  to  the  private  sector  and 
estimated using the Cross National Equivalent File 
(CNEF). 
Earnings are gross annual labour earnings in the private 
sector  divided  by  annual  hours  worked  and  are 
estimated using the same source as for employment. 
United Kingdom  Data  are  limited  to  the  private  sector  and 
estimated  using  the  Quarterly  Labour  Survey, 
September  to  November  2005.  The  educational 
attainment  of  foreign-born  individuals,  not  being 
comparable to native-born, is set to missing. 
Earnings are average gross hourly pay for employees in 
the  private  sector  and  are  estimated  using  the  same 
source as for employment  
United States  Data  are  limited  to  the  private  sector  and 
estimated  using  the  Current  Population  Survey 
(CPS). 
Hourly wages are estimated using the March Outgoing 
Group of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Earnings 
are  gross  annual  labour  earnings  divided  by  annual 
hours worked. 
 
Details on definitions and sources for regressions in Section 2 
Table 3.A1.3.  Aggregate variables 




Employed workers as share of the working-age population (15-64 age group), in %. 
Data adjustment: While the primary source is the OECD database on Labour Force 
Statistics, Annual Labour Force Statistics – which tend to be available over longer time 
periods – were also used in some cases to extrapolate employment rates backwards 
(under  the  assumption  of  similar  percentage  changes  in  unemployment  and 
employment  rates  in  both  sources).  Missing  observations  are  obtained  by  linear 
interpolation when possible. 








Employed workers as a share of the corresponding population group, in percentage.  OECD database on 
Labour Force 
Statistics. 
Wage gaps  Unexplained wage gap residuals from regression-based decompositions. The primary 
source  is  the  meta-dataset  of  Weichselbaumer  and  Winter-Ebmer  (2005),  kindly 
provided by the authors. Additional estimates for 13 European countries using ECHP 
data,  by  applying  the  Oaxaca-Blinder  decomposition  and  using  estimated  male 
regression  coefficients  to  identify  returns  to  characteristics  in  the  absence  of 
discrimination. For each country and year, the logarithm of hourly wages of prime-age 
wage and  salary male  workers  in  the private sector, working at  least 15 hours per 
week at the time of the survey, is regressed on a quadratic in potential experience, 
three levels  of  educational  attainment,  five  categories  of  firm  size,  a  dummy  for 
previous unemployment experience (plus a dummy for missing values as regards to 
previous unemployment experience), a dummy for part-time status, regional dummies 
and a spline in tenure (over the ranges 0-1 year, 1-3 years, 3-6 years, 6-9 years and 
9-15 years), plus a dummy for tenure greater than 15 years and a dummy for non-











Meta control variables are defined as in the preferred specification of Weichselbaumer 
and Winter-Ebmer  (2005).  They  concern  data selection variables,  econometric  and 
decomposition  methods  and  the  type  of  controls  included  in  the  regressions  from 











OECD summary indicator of regulatory impediments to product market competition in 
seven non-manufacturing industries. The data cover regulations and market conditions 
in  seven  energy  and  service  industries:  gas,  electricity,  post,  telecommunications 
(mobile and fixed services), passenger air transport, railways (passenger and freight 
services) and road freight. Detailed indicators exist also at the one-digit ISIC Rev. 3 
















































Number of conventions that are ratified and not denounced by a country at a given 
date, among ILO’s Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers 
for Work of Equal Value (ILO C100), ILO’s Convention on Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation (ILO C111) and the UN’s Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
Data adjustment: in the case of the CEDAW, 1/3 of unit is subtracted for reservation to 
Art. 11(1b), and 1/6 of unit is subtracted for each reservation to Art. 11(1c), Art. 11(1d) 
and Art. 11(2). The qualitative index is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if at least 














Dichotomous variable taking value  1  if  at  least  one  of  the  following  conventions  is 
ratified and not denounced: ILO’s Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and 
Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (C100), ILO’s Convention on Discrimination 
in Respect of Employment and Occupation (C111) and the UN’s Convention on the 












Number of conventions that are ratified and not denounced by a country at a given 
date, among ILO’s Conventions on the Employment of Women on Underground Work 










Number of conventions that are ratified and not denounced by a country at a given 
date, among ILO’s Conventions on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise (C87) and the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to 





Union density  Trade  union  density  rate,  i.e.  the  share  of  workers  affiliated  to  a  trade  union,  in 
percentage. 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
Union coverage  Collective bargaining coverage rate, i.e. the share of workers covered by a collective 
agreement, in percentage. 




Indicator  of  the  degree  of  centralisation/co-ordination  of  the  wage  bargaining 
processes,  which  takes  values 1  for  decentralised  and  uncoordinated  processes, 
and 2  and 3  for  intermediate  and  high  degrees  of  centralisation/co-ordination, 
respectively.  The  “high  corporatism”  dummy  variable  frequently  used  in  this  paper 
takes value 1 when bargaining is centralised or coordinated and zero otherwise. 
Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) 
EPL index  OECD  summary  indicator  of  the  stringency  of  employment  protection  legislation 
incorporating both regular contracts and temporary work.  
Data adjustment: in the aggregate wage gap regressions, this indicator is assumed to 




Tax wedge between the labour cost to the employer and the corresponding net take-
home pay of the employee for a single-earner couple with two children earning 100% 
of APW earnings. The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal income tax and all 
social security contributions as a percentage of total labour cost. 







Average unemployment benefit replacement rate across two income situations (100% 
and  67% of  APW earnings),  three  family  situations  (single,  with  dependent  spouse, 
with spouse in work) and three different unemployment durations (first year, second 
and third years, and fourth and fifth years of unemployment). 





Maximum number of leave weeks that can be taken by a mother for the birth of a first 
child as maternity leave, parental leave and childcare leave. Focus is on the  most 
generous provisions that can be obtained,  even though these may not  apply to all 
women depending on their employment history or income. Only leave provided under 
national  legislation  is  used  (variations  in  schemes  by  region,  province,  länder,  or 
canton are not included). 





Increase  in  household  disposable  income  between  a  situation  where  the  husband 
earns the entire household income (133% of average production worker earnings) and 
a  situation  where  husband  and  wife  share  earnings  (100%  and  33%  of  average 
production worker earnings respectively) for a couple with two children. Denoting the 
first scenario by A and the second by B, the calculation is: Tax incentive to part-time = 
(Household net income A - Household net income B) / Household net income A 
















































Ratio of the marginal tax rate on the second earner to the tax wedge for a single-
earner couple with two children earning 100% of APW earnings (see definition of the 
“labour  tax  wedge”  above).  The  marginal  tax  rate  on  the  second  earner  is  in  turn 
defined  as  the  share  of  the  wife’s  earnings  which  goes  into  paying  additional 
household  taxes:  Tax  2
nd  earner  = 1 - (Household  net  income B  -  Household  net 
income A) / (Household gross income B - Household gross income A), where A denotes 
the situation in which the wife does not earn any income and B denotes the situation in 
which the wife’s gross earnings are X% of APW. Two different tax rates are calculated, 
depending on whether the wife is assumed to work full-time (X = 67%) or part-time (X 
= 33%). In all cases it is assumed that the husband earns 100% of APW and that the 
couple  has  two  children.  The  difference  between  gross  and  net  income  includes 
income  taxes,  employee’s  social  security  contribution,  and  universal  cash  benefits. 
Means-tested benefits based on household income are not included (apart from some 
child benefits that vary with income) due to lack of time-series information. However, 
such benefits are usually less relevant at levels of household income above 100% of 
APW. 
Data adjustments: as this series began after 1980 for some countries, missing data 
prior to the first observation were replaced with the value of the variable in the first 
year it was available. 




Increase  in  household  disposable  income  from  child  benefits  (including  tax 
allowances) for a single-earner couple earning 100% of APW earnings. It is calculated 
as  follows:  Child  benefits  =  (Household  net  income  B  -  Household  net  income  A) / 
Household net income A, where A denotes a household earning 100 % of APW without 
children, and B denotes a household earning 100% of APW with two children. 








Number of years of education of the population aged 25 and over.  Arnold, Bassanini 
and Scarpetta 
(2007) 
Output gap  OECD measure of the gap between actual and potential output as a percentage of 
potential output. 










Share  of  the  nominal  value-added  of  industries E  and  I  (energy,  transport  and 
communications, ISIC Rev. 3 classification) in total GDP. These industries are those 
for which product market regulation indicators are defined. 
OECD, STAN 
database. 
APW: average production worker. 
Table 3.A1.4. Industry-level variables 
  Definitions  Sources 
Profitability indicator  Ratio of industry output to intermediate input, labour and capital costs. 
Data adjustments: Capital stock is constructed by perpetual inventory method for 
countries  where  it  is  not  provided  in  national  accounts  at  a  sufficiently 
disaggregated level. However, since reconstructed capital stocks are available 
only in volume terms, in practice nominal capital stocks are obtained by dividing 
them by value added in volume terms and pre-multiplying them by nominal value 
added from STAN. In the calculation of the cost of capital, following Griffith et al. 
(2006), it is assumed that capital flows freely across borders so that all countries 
face  a  world  interest  rate,  for  which  the  US  long-term  interest  rate  (from 
Bassanini and Duval, 2006) is used. 
All data come from the 
OECD STAN database, 
except for data use to 
compute capital costs 
that come from 
ECO/CPE/WP1 (2008)4. 
Employment  Number of wage and salary employees  OECD STAN database 
Gender employment 
gap 
Definition: Ratio of the male-female difference in the number of wage and salary 
employees  aged  25-54  years  and  the  number  of  male  wage  and  salary 
employees aged 25-54 years. 
European Labour Force 
Survey 
Share of employees 
aged between 45 
and 54 years 
Ratio between the number of wage and salary employees aged 45-54 years and 
the number of wage and salary employees aged 25-54 years. 
European Labour Force 
Survey 
Share of employees 
with more than upper 
secondary education 
Ratio between the number of wage and salary employees aged 25-54 years with 
more  than  upper  secondary  education  and  the  number  of  wage  and  salary 
employees aged 25-54 years. 











































Share of part-time 
employees 
Ratio  between  the  number  of  wage  and  salary  employees  aged  25-54  years 
working  less  than  30  hours  a  week  and  the  number  of  wage  and  salary 
employees aged 25-54 years. 
European Labour Force 
Survey 
Share of employees 
with more than upper 
secondary education 
Ratio  between  the  number  of  wage  and  salary  employees  aged  25-54  years 
working in firms with 10 employees or less and the number of wage and salary 
employees aged 25-54 years. 
European Labour Force 
Survey 
Note: all variables coming from the European Labour Force Survey refer to employees working at least 15 hours a week and living in 













































Table 3.A2.1. National legal and institutional framework to fight labour market discrimination 
on gender and ethnic grounds
a 
  Main national anti-discrimination laws  Main bodies contributing to the promotion and 




Sex Discrimination Act (enacted in 1984) 
Racial Discrimination Act (enacted in 1975) 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(Human  Rights  and  Equal  Opportunity  Commission Act, 




Equal Treatment Act (enacted in 1979, last amended 
in 2005), for private sector 
Ombud for Equal Treatment 
Commission for Equal Treatment (independent body) 
(Act on the Equal Treatment Commission and the Equal 




Law  of  10  May  2007  Combating  Discrimination 
between Women and Men 
Law of 10 May 2007, amending Law of 30 July 1981 
Criminalising  Certain  Acts  Inspired  by  Racism  and 
Xenophobia 
Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism 
(1993) 









Charter  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  and  Freedoms 
(Sec. 14) 
Law  N° 435/2004  Coll.  on  Employment  (Sec. 4, 
Para. 1,2,9, and Sec. 12, Para 1a) 
Law  N° 218/2002  Coll.  on  Official  Service  in  State 
Administration and on Remuneration of these Official 
and Other Employees (Sec. 80, Para. 1) 
No specialised bodies in charge of discrimination issues 
Employment  Offices  and  Labour  Inspectorates  are 
relevant for some enforcement aspects.  
Denmark  Act  on  Prohibition  of  Discrimination  on  the  Labour 
Market (enacted 2005). 
Act on Equal Treatment (enacted in 2006), first time 
similar act passed, 1978. 
Act  on  Equal  Pay  (enacted  in  2006),  first  time 
passed, 1976. 
Gender Equality Act (enacted in 2002) 
Gender  only:  Centre  for  Information  on  Women  and 
Gender  (KVINFO,  since  1964);  Gender  Equality  Board 
(since 2002). 
Ethnicity only: Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), 
since  2002;  Complaints  Committee  for  Ethnic  Equal 
Treatment (since 2003). 
Finland  Act  on  Equality  between  Women  and  Men 
(609/1986, last amended in 2005) 
Non-Discrimination Act (21/2004, enacted in 2004) 
Provincial Act on Prevention of Discrimination in the 
province of Åland (66/2005). 
Gender  only:  the  Ombudsman  for  Equality  and  the 
Equality Board (established in 1987); Council for Gender 
Equality (established in 1972) 
Ethnicity only: Ombudsman for Minorities (established in 
2001). 
Occupational safety and health inspectorate (established 
in 1972). 
France  Law Combating Discrimination (enacted in 2001) 
Law  on  Equal  Opportunities  (grounds:  race  and 
religion, enacted in 2006) 
Labour, Civil and Penal Codes 
High  Authority  Combating  Discrimination  and  Promoting 
Equality, HALDE 
(Law creating the specialised body, enacted in 2004) 
Germany  Act on Equal Treatment/Anti-discrimination (enacted 
in 2006) 
Protection Against Dismissal Act 
Federal Anti-discrimination Office (established in 2006) 
Greece  Act 3488/2006, on the “Application of the principle of 
equal  treatment  of  men  and  women  regarding 
access  to  employment,  vocational  training  and 
professional  advancement,  and  working  terms  and 
conditions and other relevant provisions”. 
Act  3304/2005  respecting  the  “Application  of  the 
principle of equal treatment irrespective of racial or 
national  extraction,  religious  or  other  beliefs, 
disability, age or sexual orientation”. 
Greek  Ombudsman  (public  sector  only,  established  in 
1997)  
Labour Inspectorate Body (private sector only, established 
in 1954) 
Gender  only:  General  Secretariat  for  Equality  of  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior,  Public  Administration  and 
Decentralization; Regional Committees for Equality (since 
1985);  and  Research  Centre  on  Equality  Matters,  legal 
entity  under  private  law  supervised  by  the  General 
Secretariat for Equality (since 1994). 
Ethnicity  only:  Economic  and  Social  Council  of  Greece 
(founded  in  1994,  established  by  the  Constitution  of 










































Italy  Gender:  Legislative  decree  n.  198/2006  (amending 
previous laws). 
Ethnicity:  Legislative  decree  n.215/2003  and 
Legislative decree n.286/1998 (Immigration law). 
Statute  of  Workers  (both  gender  and  ethnicity), 
regulating dismissals, since 1970. 
Gender only: Network of Equality Advisors (since 2000). 
Ethnicity  only:  National  Office  Against  Racial 
Discriminations (since 2004).  
Japan  Gender  only:  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Law 
(enacted in 1986, amended in 1999 and 2007) and 
Labour Standards Law (Art. 4) 
Gender only: Equal Employment Office of the Prefectural 
Labour Bureau (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) 
and  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Conciliation 
Commission  established  at  each  Prefectural  Labour 
Bureau 
Korea  Equal employment Act (enacted in 1987, revised in 
1989, 1999 and 2005) 
National Human Rights Commission Act (enacted in 
2001)  
As for ethnic/racial discrimination, there is no specific 
law beyond the NHRCA that aims at securing human 
rights in general. 
National  Human  Rights  Commission  (established  in 
2001).  Not  really  specialised  in  discrimination  issues. 
Rather, this commission aims at securing human rights in 
general. 
Mexico  Constitution (Art. 1 as amended in 2001) 
Federal  Law  for  the  Prevention  and  Elimination  of 
Discrimination (enacted in 2003) 
Federal Labour Law 
National  Council  for  the  Prevention  of  Discrimination 
(established in 2004) 
Labour Inspectorate 
Federal Public Labour’s Defender Office 
Conciliation and Arbitration Board  
Netherlands  General Equal Treatment Act (enacted in 1994, last 
amended in 2004) 
Equal Treatment Commission (established in 1994) 
Norway   Gender  Equality  Act  (enacted  in  1978,  last  major 
amendment in 2005) 
Anti Discrimination Act (2006)  
Equality  and  Anti-Discrimination  Ombud  (established  in 
2006) 
Poland  Labour Code (as amended in 2001 and 2003) 
Act  of  20  April  2004  on  the  Promotion  of 
Employment and Labour Market Institutions. 
(also important: Act on National Labour Inspectorate) 
Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Policy-  Department  of 
Women,  Family  and  Counteracting  Discrimination 
(January 2005) 
National Labour Inspectorate 
Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection 
Portugal  Labour Code, Law 99/2003 (all grounds) 
Labour  Relation  Act,  Law 35/2004  regulating 
Law 99/2003 (all grounds) 
Law  18/2004  on  Racial  and  Ethnic  Origin 
Discrimination (amended in 2005) 
Gender: Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality 
(established in 2007, prior Commission for Equality and 
Women’s  Rights,  1992,  and  Commission  for  Women’s 
Status, around 1975); Commission for Equality in Labour 
and Employment (established in 1999) 
Ethnicity:  Commission  for  Equality  and  Against  Racial 
Discrimination (established in 1999), presided by the High 
Commissariat for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities 
All grounds: General Labour Inspectorate 
Spain  Law 3/2007 for Effective Equality Between Men and 
Women 
Law 62/2003  on  fiscal,  administrative  and  social 
measures  (Title II,  Chapter III,  including  ethnic 
ground) 
Workers’ Statute (law 8/1980, Royal Decree 1/1995); 
Law on Employment (56/2003); 
Law on Labour procedures (Royal Decree 2/1995); 
Law  on  Procedure  in  Industrial  Disputes  Royal 
Decree 7/1995); 
Law  on  Infringements  and  Penalties  in  the  Social 
Sphere (Royal Decree 5/2000); 
Social Security and Employment Inspection Service. 
 
Women’s  Participation  Council  (established  by 
Law 3/2007): not yet operational 
Council for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons 
without discrimination  on the grounds  of racial or  ethnic 
origin (established by Law 62/2003): not yet operational 
 
Sweden  Equal Opportunities Act (enacted in 1991/92, gender 
ground only) 
Measures  to  Counteract  Ethnic  Discrimination  in 
Working Life Act (enacted in 1999) 
Equal Opportunities Ombudsman (established in 1980) 
Ombudsman against ethnic discrimination (established in 
1986) 
Switzerland  Federal Act on Gender Equality (enacted in 1995) 
(also: Swiss Code of Obligations) 
No specific Law as regards discrimination based on 
ethnic or racial grounds. 
Federal Office for Equality between Women and Men 
Federal Office for Equality between Women and Men. 














































Sex  Discrimination  Act  (enacted  in  1975,  last 
amended in 2005) 
Equal  Pay  Act  (enacted  in  1970,  last  amended  in 
2005, gender only) 
Race Relations Act (enacted in 1976, last amended 
in 2003) 
Equality  and  Human  Rights  Commission  (established  in 
2007) 






Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (enacted in 1964) 
Federal Executive Order 11246 
Section 188 of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (established 
in 1965) 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (charged 
with  enforcing  Executive  Order  11246,  established  in 
1965) 
a) Whenever no distinction is made between gender and ethnic grounds, answers cover both of them. 
b) Country notes:  
Australia:  Australia  is  a  federal  state  and  in  addition  to  the  federal  framework,  each  State  and  Territory  of  Australia  has  anti-
discrimination legislation and an equal opportunity or anti-discrimination board and/or tribunal. However, once a complaint of unlawful 
discrimination is dealt with in one jurisdiction, it cannot be considered in another. More precisely: a person cannot make a complaint 
of discrimination with HREOC under federal legislation after they have made a complaint, instituted a proceeding or taken any other 
action under an analogous State or Territory law about the same events. This operates to prevent complainants ‘double dipping’ by 
making the same complaint in multiple jurisdictions and seeking multiple remedies for the same complaint. 
Austria: employment of federal civil servants and employees is covered by the Federal Equal Treatment Act (enacted in 1993, last 
amended in 2004). 
Belgium: the Federal State is responsible for regulating employment contracts and general rules of civil and criminal law. To the 
extent it takes the form of such rules, anti-discrimination legislation will therefore normally be dealt with at federal level. However, 
since these residual competences of the Federal State may not be exercised in order to intrude upon areas which are reserved to the 
Regions or Communities, they may not affect, in particular, the exclusive competence of the Regions and Communities to define the 
status of their personnel (public bodies and personnel of the governments); the exclusive competence of the Communities to define 
the status of schoolteachers and other personnel in the educational sector; or the exclusive competence of the Communities in the 
field of disability policy. All the federal entities – the Flemish Community/Region, the Region of Brussels-Capital, the Walloon Region, 
the  French-speaking  Community and  the  German-speaking  Community  –  have  taken various  initiatives  in the  above  mentioned 
areas, but the general rules are nevertheless laid down at federal level. (De Schutter, 2007). 
Canada: main federal anti-discrimination law (federal jurisdiction). Canada is a federation and, under its Constitution, legislative and 
executive powers are conferred on two levels of government, which are each sovereign in their respective spheres. As a rule, labour 
law falls under the jurisdiction of the provinces and territories, except for certain sectors that belong to the federal jurisdiction. These 
sectors include the federal public service, the banking sector, the transportation sector and telecommunications.  As a result, about 
1.1 million of the roughly 15 million Canadian workers are covered by federal labour legislation, and the rest – roughly 93% – come 
under provincial and territorial jurisdiction, which each has their own labour and anti-discrimination laws and regimes. However, laws 
similar to the CHRA exist in all ten provinces and three territories. As a result, anti-discrimination provisions as established in the 
CHRA are fairly representative of the overall Canadian situation. 
Czech  Republic:  legislation  in  force  in  2007.  An  anti-discrimination  law,  implementing  the  EU  Directives,  is  currently  under 
preparation. 
Switzerland:  no  specific  equality  bodies  in  charge  of  issues  related  to  discrimination  at  the  workplace  against  racial  or  ethnic 
minorities.  However,  the  Federal  Commission  against  Racism  and  the  Service  for  Combating  Racism  may  offer  guidance  and 
counselling to victims of discrimination. In addition, more specific equality bodies can be found in a small number of cantons. 
United Kingdom: from 1 October 2007, the Commission for Equality and Human Rights (Equality and Human Rights Commission) 
takes on the role and functions of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) and the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC), with new responsibilities for sexual orientation, age, religion and belief, and human rights. The 
Arbitration, Conciliatory and Advisory Service is an independent service which impartially helps employers and employees to resolve 
disputes at work, through a formal procedure  (form COT3), so that a  hearing is  not necessary. Typically, an ACAS conciliation 
officer's first involvement with a dispute will come after the complaint has already been made to the ET, although ACAS officers may 
be consulted earlier for advice with a view to achieving a resolution of the dispute. In addition, since the introduction of the Dispute 
Resolution Regulations  which came into force on 1 October 2004, there are new compulsory procedures that all employers and 
employees must use in attempting to resolve issues of grievances (such as discrimination claims), disciplinary action and dismissal 
where a grievance is formalised. The purpose of their introduction was to encourage employment disputes to be resolved internally 
without the need for costly and time consuming employment tribunal claims. 
United States: each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have separate laws addressing many of these same 
matters. Two states, Alabama and Mississippi, do not have EEO statutes covering gender or ethnicity. In addition, many counties, 
cities, and other local jurisdictions have laws or ordinances that prohibit gender and ethnicity discrimination. Some of these laws are 
similar to the federal law and some are different.  Moreover, even where the laws are similar, state and local courts may interpret 










































Table 3.A2.2. Selected studies estimating the impact of anti-discrimination laws in the United States 
  Laws and indentification 
strategy 
Grounds, areas of 
concern and data 
Estimation results 
Beller (1982)  Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act 
Estimations  rely  on  a  legal 
variable defined as the expected 
costs of violating the law, which 
depend  on  the  probability  of 
apprehension  for  violating 
Title VII  and  the  probability  of 
paying  a  penalty  if  found 
violating it. 
Gender, earnings and 
employment. 
CPS data, 1967, 1971 
and 1974. 
Title VII narrowed the sex differential in earnings by 
about 7 percentage points, and the sex differential in 
the  probability  of  being  employed  in  a  male 
occupation by about 6 percentage points. The law's 
effect took time to meterialise: it was stronger over 
the 1971-74 period than over 1967-71. 
(note: when the Civil Rights Act was strengthen in 
1972, the EEOC was given the authority to initiate 
litigation  on  its  own  – until  1972,  the  EEOC  was 
limited to merely a passive role) 
Leonard (1984)  Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act 
Estimations  rely  on  a  legal 
variable  defined  as  the  number 
of Title VII class action suits. 
Ethnicity, employment. 
555 state  by  two-digit 
SIC  industry  cells 
within  manufacturing, 
with  observations  in 
both 1966 and 1978. 
Over the 1966-78 period, Title VII litigation increased 
the  share  of  black  workers  in  total  manufacturing 
employment by 3.4% (by 2.9% for black men and by 
13%  for  black  women)  and  the  share  of  black 
workers in professional and managerial employment 
by 31.6%. 
Chay (1998)  Equal  Employment  Opportunity 
Act  of  1972,  which  extended 
Title VII  coverage  to  employers 
with  15-24 employees  (while 
leaving unaffected the civil rights 
protection  for  employees  of 
larger firms). 
Ethnicity, earnings and 
employment. 
CPS  data  aggregated 
into  industry-by-region 
cells, 1973-79. 
Over the 1973-79 period, black employment shares 
grew  0.5-1.1 points  more  per  year  and  the  black-
white earnings gap narrowed, on average, 0.11-0.18 
log points more at newly covered than at previously 
covered employers after the federal mandate. 
Hahn et al. 
(1999) 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act 
The  estimation  methodology 
takes advantage of the fact that 
firms with fewer than 15 emplo-






For two years in the panel used (1987 and 1991), 
Title VII  coverage  has  a  statistically  significant 
positive  effect  on  the  employment  of  black  and 
Hispanic  workers.  The  magnitude  of the  estimated 
effects  varies  from  3  to  11%  (depending  on 
estimation  methodologies  and  specifications), 
meaning that minorities’ share of employment is 3-
11 percentage points higher in firms covered under 




Gender  anti-discrimination  laws 
in force before the enactment of 
Title VII,  primarily  concerning 
equal  pay  without  employment 
protection provisions. 
Racial anti-discrimination laws in 
force  before  the  enactment  of 
Title  VII,  prohibiting  discrimi-
nation  in  hiring,  dismissals, 
terms of employment, etc. 
The  estimation  methodology 
takes  advantage  of  variation 
across  states  and  time  in  the 
introduction  of  anti-
discrimination law. 
Gender, earnings and 
employment. 
CPS data, 1940-60. 
Equal  pay  laws  decreased  (by  2-6%)  the  relative 
employment  of  women.  This  effect  was  immediate 
and persistent over time. They also had a positive 
effect  on  relative  earnings,  which  took  time  to 
materialise  (about  six years,  the  relative  earnings 
growing by 0.34-0.26% per year after an immediate 
decrease following the enactement of state laws). 
Ethnicity, earnings and 
employment. 
CPS data, 1940-60 
(men) 
Anti-discrimination  laws  increased  the  relative 
earnings of black  workers. This effect took time to 
materialise:  relative  earnings  grew  by  0.28%  per 
year  following  the  passage  of  state  laws  barring 
racial discrimination. These laws had no impact on 
the relative employment of black workers. 













































CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF GENDER GAPS 
METHODOLOGY AND DETAILED RESULTS 
Regression-based decompositions of gender and ethnic wage gaps 
Possible sources of pay inequality between gender or ethnic groups are differences in human capital 
endowments and productivity-relevant characteristics (e.g. age, education and employment experience, but 
also less easily observed individual characteristics such as work motivation and effort) and differences in 
pay,  “all  other  things  equal”.  In  particular,  differences  in  pay  “all  other  things  equal”  reflect  pay 
discrimination. Regression-based decomposition analysis tries to identify the different components of the 
wage gap between two groups using the method devised by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). 
The objective of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the wage gap is to identify the contribution of 
observed endowments and productive characteristics. To do this, one needs to know how much the labour 
market “pays” for such endowments and characteristics. Different approaches exist in the literature on how 
to estimate these remuneration rates. The original approach suggested by Oaxaca and Blinder is to use as a 
benchmark a wage regression estimated on one group (possibly the largest or the least likely to be affected 
by selectivity into employment and/or discrimination – e.g. men in the case of the gender wage gap). The 
estimated  coefficients  from  the  benchmark  regression  can  be  interpreted  as  the  market  price  for  the 
observed characteristics that would apply to both men and women in the absence of discrimination. The 
product of these coefficients and the average gender gaps in the corresponding variables leads to a simple 
decomposition  of  the  differential  between  average  hourly  wages  into  a  part  due  to  gaps  in  observed 
characteristics  and  an  unexplained  residual.  The  latter  reflects  gender  differences  in  unobserved 
characteristics  and/or  discriminatory  wage-setting  practices  that  are  unrelated  to  individual  productive 
characteristics. Formally, this decomposition can be written as: 
  i i i i X W ε β ∆ + ∆ = ∆log ,  
where i indexes the unit of analysis (country and time or country, industry and time), ¯ and ∆ refer to 
country/time  (or  country/industry/time)  averages  and  gaps  between  men  and  women,  respectively,  W 
stands for gross hourly wages, X for the matrix of observable endowments and characteristics, β for the 
vector of estimated coefficients from the benchmark regressions and ε for the computed residuals from 
these  regression  coefficients  (that  is,  the  difference  between  actual  and  predicted  values,  the  latter 
computed using the estimated coefficients from the estimated wage regression for the benchmark group).  
Variations on this approach have been developed in the literature (see e.g. Altonji and Blank, 1999, 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2007, for references). Most of them concern the choice of benchmark 
equations and methods to use a weighted average of equations of both groups as benchmark. A few of 
them  can  provide  additional  light  on  geographical  or  time  differences  in  the  unexplained  residual.  In 
particular in the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition (Juhn et al. 1991), the difference between average 
unexplained residuals can  be further decomposed under the extreme hypothesis that it can be entirely 










































geographical or time differences in remuneration rates for unobserved characteristics  are  estimated by 
assuming that they are fully reflected by differences between residual distributions of the benchmark group 
(that is assuming, in the case of the gender wage gap, that greater residual male wage dispersion reflects 
steeper  returns  to  marketable  characteristics).  Then  geographical  or  time  differences  in  gaps  in 
unobservable  characteristics  are  obtained  by  subtraction.  This  approach  is  used  by  Blau  and  Kahn  to 
underscore the role of institutions affecting the dispersion of wages in shaping the gender wage gap (see 
e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1996, 2000). However, it rules out discrimination by assumption. 
Model specification for the analyses of the gender employment and wage gaps  
Employment 
Aggregate analysis 
The following simple linear regression model is estimated for the aggregate gender employment gap: 
  it i t i it it it T X PMR EG ε δ λ µ β α + + + + + =  
where EG, PMR, and X stand for the working-age population gender employment gap, product market 
regulation and a vector of control variables, respectively, while µ, λ and T stand for country i fixed effects, 
time t effects and (country-specific) time trends (that are included to control for the marked downward 
trend in both the employment gap and regulation), α and β are parameters to be estimated and ε is a 
standard  error  term.  In  contrast  to  section 3.1,  the  analysis  focuses  here  on  the  whole  working-age 
population  rather  than  prime-age  workers  only  to  maximise  the  length  of  time  series.  In  certain 
specifications, import penetration is used as an alternative indicator of competition or as an additional 
control variable. In the analysis of ratification of international anti-discrimination conventions, qualitative 
or quantitative indexes of convention ratifications are added to the equation above (see below). 
The gender gap in labour force participation and the aggregate employment rate are two key control 
variables that are systematically included in the specifications (except in sensitivity analyses that replicate 
results with no controls but fixed effects and trends), the former representing labour supply factors and the 
latter  proxying  the  effect  of  aggregate  labour  demand  (whose  movements  are  likely  to  affect 
disproportionately groups that are at the margins of the labour market). Both of them are endogenous and 
the interpretation of their coefficient might be problematic. In particular, the coefficient of the participation 
gap  might  be  overestimated  to  the  extent  that  third  factors  might  co-determine  participation  and 
employment gaps. For instance, lower opportunities for women in high-skilled/high-pay jobs (consistent 
with  correspondence  tests,  see  main  text)  could  simultaneously  reduce  female  employment  and 
participation. However, as a first approximation, this might be regarded as a relatively minor problem 
insofar as it will leave a smaller share of the employment gap to be explained by other factors and, thus, 
will  probably  lead  to  an  underestimate  of  the  coefficients  of  these  factors,  including  product  market 
regulation. Conversely, even in an equation where total employment is included, insofar as product market 
regulation is likely to affect aggregate demand, its coefficient will probably capture the effect of regulatory 
reforms on labour demand and cannot be interpreted as yielding evidence on discrimination. To sort this 
problem out, the model above is estimated in two steps. First, the employment gap is regressed on the 
participation gap and the aggregate employment rate plus country and time effects and country-specific 
trends;  second,  the  residual  from  the  first  step  is  then  regressed  on  product  market  regulation,  other 
controls and country and time effects and country-specific trends. The estimated effect of regulation can 
then be interpreted as its effect over and above its impact on aggregate demand. Only two-step estimates 
are reported, although differences from standard, single-step, OLS estimates are minor. Following Black 
and Lynch (2001) among others, first-step estimates are obtained on the largest possible sample, in order to 
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smaller  (however, the  same results concerning  product market  regulation  are  obtained when  the  same 
sample is used for both the first and the second step). 
Two other groups of controls deserve attention. First, structural shifts towards service sectors have 
modified labour demand, possibly increasing opportunities for women. As the indicator of product market 
regulation that is used here is based on regulation in non-manufacturing industries, one can expect that its 
estimated  coefficient  partially  reflects  this  structural  shift  rather  than  its  effect  on  discriminatory 
behaviours. For this reason, the service sector share – or, alternatively, the share of industries for which 
regulatory indicators are constructed – is included in most regression models. Second, deregulation in the 
product market, by reducing the size of rents, might reduce the bargaining power of insiders, thereby 
increasing opportunities for women who, being newcomers in the labour market, are more represented 
among outsiders. To control for this effect, a few of the equations include trade union density, whose time 
path can proxy the evolution of insiders’ strength. In addition, most models include an interaction between 
the aggregate employment rate and the average degree of coverage of collective bargaining agreements 
over the sample period, which is expected to attract a negative sign since the effect of aggregate demand on 
the  employment  of  disadvantaged  groups  is  likely  to  be  greater,  the  greater  the  bargaining  power  of 
insiders. 
The  regression  analysis  of  the  impact  of  product  market  regulation  on  the  employment  rate  is 
performed on data concerning 21 OECD countries between 1975 and 2003 for Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Following OECD (2004, 
Chapter 2) and Bassanini and Duval (2006), in both the aggregate employment and wage gap analyses, 
observations for Germany, Finland and Sweden in 1991-1992 are excluded from the sample and additional 
country-specific dummies for the post-1992 period for these countries are included in order to capture the 
German reunification, the impact on the Finnish economy of the fall of the Soviet Union and the Swedish 
housing and banking crisis. 
Industry-level analysis 
The role of competitive pressures in shaping gender employment gaps is analysed also on the basis of 
industry-level data  for  13 European countries  and 16 manufacturing  and  non-manufacturing  industries 
from 1992 to 2002. As regulatory indicators are available for 3 industries only at the available level of 
disaggregation (STAN standard classification, corresponding to 2 letters of the ISIC Rev.3 classification), 
it was not possible to replicate meaningfully the aggregate model using data on these three industries (see 
below). By contrast, following Griffith, Harrison and Simpson (2006), average profitability, defined as the 
ratio of output to intermediate input, labour and capital costs, is used here as a proxy for product market 
power  (and  therefore  of  lack  of  competition).  Boone  (2000)  shows  that  this  measure  of  (lack  of) 
competition  is  preferable  to  most  other  commonly-used  measures.  It  is  more  theoretically  robust, 
particularly than those based on market concentration and market shares: it can be shown to be equivalent 
to the measure proposed by Roeger (1995), and is equivalent to the price-cost margin or mark-up under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale. 
The estimated model can be written as: 
 
it j it ijt ijt ijt X P EG ε η µ β α + + + + =
 
where P stands for average profitability of industry  j  in country  i  at time  t, X for a vector of controls 
defined at the country, time and industry level, while µ and η captures country-by-time and industry fixed 
effects,  the  former  controlling  for  all  aggregate  factors  including  determinants  of  labour  market 










































logarithm of total employment in the industry and its interaction with the average degree of coverage of 
collective bargaining agreements. For the same reasons as above, equations are also estimated in two steps. 
First, the employment gap is regressed on all controls and fixed effects; second, the residual from the first 
step is regressed on profitability and fixed effects. Again, only the two-step estimates are reported. In 
contrast with the aggregate analysis, the employment gap is defined here simply as the difference between 
male and female prime-age employees as a percentage of male prime-age employment. In a number of 
estimates, industry-by-time effects are also included to control for industry-specific trends.  
One problem with the use of average profitability indicators is that they might be endogenous. First, 
the  time  path  of  average  price-cost  margins  might,  in  some  rare  cases,  not  reflect  the  dynamics  of 
competition (Boone, 2008). Second, the empirical measure of profitability used is very crude. In both these 
cases, measurement error is likely to bias estimates towards zero. Third, the empirical measure, due to the 
way it is computed, might reflect investment in intangibles, such as expenditure in research & development 
(R&D) activities and training. Yet, R&D intensity and training in European countries have increased the 
most in non-manufacturing industries (OECD, 2007, Bassanini and Brunello, 2007) where also the greatest 
contraction of the employment gap was observed; therefore, one can expect a negative correlation between 
the  accumulation  of  intangible  capital  and  the  gender  employment  gap.  In  all  these  three  cases,  the 
coefficient of profitability is likely to be downward biased or underestimate the effect of competition, 
making it therefore more difficult to find evidence of taste-based discrimination. Fourth, mark-ups appear 
to have a countercyclical behaviour. Whether this makes estimates based on profitability measures more 
informative or, conversely, induces a bias depends on whether the countercyclical patterns are due to the 
fact that competition increases in upturns for reasons unrelated to regulation, as the literature seems to 
suggest, or reflects other factors (see Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta, 2002, and the literature cited therein). 
Fifth and more problematic, if firms statistically discriminate on the basis of true stereotypes, one would 
expect prejudiced firms to make greater profits, and this would bias upwards the estimated coefficient of 
profitability, due to reverse causality.  
While  downward  biases  are  a  minor  problem  –  they  simply  make  it  more  difficult  to  establish 
evidence of discrimination when discrimination is present – upward biases are a matter of concern. To sort 
this problem out, one could look at regulatory reforms in the 3 industries for which data are available for 
all countries and years. However, the sample size would be very small in this case, and country-by-time 
dummies would sweep away the effect of a large number of reforms that are quasi-simultaneous in all the 
three industries. For this reason, and given that our data are limited to European countries, the alternative 
strategy suggested by Bassanini and Brunello (2007) is followed here – the latter takes advantage of the 
fact that nation-wide aspects of regulation are controlled for in specifications including country-by-time 
effects.  The  sample  is  restricted  to  a  time  period  sufficiently  remote  from  the  implementation  of  the 
European Single Market Programme (SMP) in 1992 (starting in 1994 in countries that were EU members 
when the SMP came into action and in 1995 in countries that were EFTA members at that time). It is then 
further  restricted  to  non-manufacturing  industries  for  which  regulation  data  are  available  and 
manufacturing industries where, as a first approximation, no change in industry-specific anti-competitive 
regulation can be assumed in the post-SMP period (yielding a total of 11 industries). Then the equation 
above is re-estimated using industry-specific regulation data, set to be equal to an arbitrary constant in 
manufacturing. It can be argued, however, that, although intra-European trade barriers were lifted by the 
implementation of the SMP, trade barriers still exist with respect to non-European countries. A further 
refinement of this strategy consists in exploiting the fact that EU trade policy is common to all EU member 
countries. The sample is therefore further reduced to EU members only (thus excluding Norway), for 
which there is no cross-country variation in sector-specific trade barriers, and equations are re-estimated by 












































 41 Furthermore, in a sensitivity analysis on the same reduced sample, the equation above is re-
estimated using an instrumental-variables approach where regulatory indicators are used as an instrument 
for profitability. 
Wage 
For the wage gap analysis, Weichselbaumer and Winter Ebmer’s meta-data (kindly provided by the 
authors)  are  matched  with additional  estimates  of  the  unexplained wage-gap  residual  obtained for the 
purpose of this chapter in 13 European countries using ECHP data (see below). The resulting matched 
meta-dataset is restricted to OECD countries – that is to 1024 separate estimates of the wage gap in 20 
OECD countries between 1975 and 2001. It is then analysed with the instruments of metadata, using a two-
stage analysis. In a first stage the wage residual is regressed on meta-variables plus country-by-time fixed 
effects.  The  included meta-variables  follow  the  preferred specification of Weichselbaumer and  Winter 
Ebmer (2005) and are of essentially three categories: i) variables concerning data selection; ii) variables 
capturing  econometric  and  decomposition  methods;  and  iii)  variables  specifying  the  type  of  controls 
included in the regressions from which unexplained wage gap residuals were obtained. The objective of 
these  meta-covariates  is  to  make  residual  wage  gaps  comparable  independently  of  methods,  selection 
criteria and specifications. First-stage estimates of country-by-time effects represent therefore estimates of 
wage residuals that are comparable across countries and over time. Following Weichselbaumer and Winter 
Ebmer (2005), probability weights equal to the inverse of the number of estimates per country and year 
provided by each study are assigned to each observation. In a second stage, these estimated effects are 
regressed on policy covariates, weighting observations on the basis of first-stage variances of country-by-
time effects. The second-stage specification takes the form: 
  it i t i it it it T X PMR W ε δ λ µ β α + + + + + =  
where W represents first-stage country-by-time effects, while other symbols are as above. Controls include 
the logarithm of the relative employment rate and labour market institutions that could also capture wage 
dispersion (unfortunately OECD time series on wage dispersion are too patchy to be matched with wage 
residual  data).  In  the  analysis  of  ratification  of  international  conventions,  the  quantitative  index  of 
convention  ratifications  only  is  included  –  since  by  1975,  the  first  year  of  the  sample,  most  OECD 
countries had already ratified at least one ILO convention on discrimination, the qualitative index shows 
too little time variation to be used in the analysis. The final second-stage sample is strongly unbalanced 
with a total size of 188 observations. The use of a two-step estimation strategy is a major difference from 
Weichselbaumer and Winter Ebmer (2007), who estimate everything in one step. The reason to choose it 
here is that half of the studies in the sample concerning OECD countries are based on US data. As a 
consequence, with single-stage estimates, results will be driven by one single country. This is not the case 
in their paper since their sample also contains non-OECD countries. 
Unexplained  wage-gap  residuals  from  ECHP  data  are  obtained  by  applying  the  Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition  (see  above),  using  estimated  male  regression  coefficients  to  identify  returns  to 
characteristics in the absence of discrimination. For each country and year, the logarithm of hourly wages 
of prime-age wage and salary male workers in the private sector, working at least 15 hours per week at the 
time of the survey, are regressed on a quadratic in potential experience, 3 levels of educational attainment, 
                                                       
41.  It is important to observe here that, particularly in specifications where the sample is further restricted to 
EU countries only, most of the remaining regulatory changes affecting manufacturing industries – that is 
administrative regulation that is common to all industries in a country and tariff and non-tariff barriers that 
are industry-specific but common to all countries – are controlled for by country-by-time and industry-by-
time dummies. In other words, in manufacturing, the correlation between profitability and employment gap 










































five categories of firm size, a dummy for previous unemployment experience (plus a dummy for missing 
values as regards to previous unemployment experience), a dummy for part-time status, regional dummies 
and a spline in tenure (over the ranges 0-1 year, 1-3 years, 3-6 years, 6-9 years and 9-15 years), plus a 
dummy for tenure greater than 15 years and a dummy for non-reported tenure values. 
The meta-analysis is performed on a strongly unbalanced sample  concerning 20 OECD countries 
between  1975  and  2001  (Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom,  the  United States).  Since  most  OECD  countries  had  already  ratified  at  least  one 
convention by 1975, due to the small number of country-by-time points before 1975 for which wage data 
are  available,  an  analysis  of  wage  gaps  and  the  qualitative  index  of  anti-discrimination  convention 
ratification is not undertaken, in contrast with what done for the employment gap. The second-stage sample 
contains a maximum of 188 country-by-year observations. Due to the small sample size, results from this 
wage gap analysis must be taken with caution. To improve the reliability of estimates, a standard procedure 
to eliminate large outliers was used. First, the dependent variable was regressed on a time trend only and, 
within this “neutral” specification, outliers (that is observations with excessive deviation from a common 
time trend) were identified  using the asymptotic  Welsch-Kuh distance  cutoff and  the  covariance  ratio 
cutoff  (see  Chatterji  and Hadi,  1988).  Then  second-stage  specifications  corresponding  to  the  equation 
above  were  re-estimated  excluding  these  outliers.  This  correction  has  a  noteworthy  impact  on  the 
coefficient of product market regulation. 
Detailed estimation results 
Results on the aggregate effect of product market regulation are presented in Table 3.B.1. Industry-
level  results  are  presented  in  Table  3.B.2.  Aggregate  estimates  are  robust  to  a  series  of  sensitivity 
exercises:  i)  estimating  the  specifications  in  first-differences ;  ii)  excluding  time  trends  from  the 
specifications ;  iii)  including  the  logarithm  of  import  penetration  as  an  additional  covariate  or  as  an 
alternative  to  regulatory  indicators  (the  latter  permitted  to  expand  sample  size  to  28  countries) ;  iv) 
excluding the labour market participation gap and total employment rate from the specifications, either 
altogether or one by one; v) including the gender gap in educational attainment (from Bassanini and Duval, 
2006) ; vi) including the logarithm of average years of education (from Arnold, Bassanini and Scarpetta, 
2007) ; vii) substituting the share of industries covered by the regulatory indicators for the share of total 
services ; and viii) including the output gap in the specifications. Main results are also robust to alternative 
specifications of the dependent variable such as the absolute gender difference in employment rates and the 
gender gap in non-employment rates. These results are not reported in Table 1, but are available from the 
Secretariat on request. 
The analysis of the association between convention ratifications and the employment gap is performed 
on  two  unbalanced  samples:  an  extended  sample  covering  all  countries  and  years  for  which  data  are 
available  –  including  28  countries  from  1960  to  2003  (all  OECD  countries  except  Iceland  and 
Luxembourg) – and a more restricted sample – 21 countries from 1975 to 2003 as above – where product 
market regulation indicators are available and a larger list of controls can be included. However, since 
most OECD countries had already ratified at least one convention by 1975, the analysis of the association 
of the qualitative index with the employment gap is not repeated in the restricted sample. Results from 
these experiments are presented in Table 3.B.3. 
The  dates  of  ratification  of  international  conventions  are  potentially  endogenous  variables.  In 
particular,  countries  might  ratify  anti-discrimination  conventions  when  female  presence  in  the  labour 
market becomes important, so that i) women can lobby for the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation 
and  ii)  anti-discrimination  legislation,  being  de  facto  less  binding,  attracts  less  opposition.  As  this  is 
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reverse causality bias. Performed on the 1960-2003 sample, they show evidence that indexes of convention 
ratifications  Granger-cause  the  employment  gap  and,  conversely,  are  not  Granger-caused  by  it  at 
conventional significance levels. These results are not reported in Table 3.B.3 but are available from the 
Secretariat on request. 
Results from wage gap equations are presented in Table 3.B.4 and Table 3.B.5. To increase sample 
size, the EPL indicator has been set at its 1982 values for years preceding that date. Due to the small 
sample size, additional institutional variables included in the specification corresponding to the fourth and 
eight columns of Table 1 are not included in specifications in Tables 3.B.4 and 3.B.5. 
The effect of product market regulation on the wage gap is robust to the inclusion of the employment 
gap (see Table 3.B.4). The reverse is also true: if the weighted average of available unexplained wage-gap 
residuals from different studies, corrected by meta control variables – that is the dependent variable used in 
the second stage of wage-gap equations presented in Table 4, is included in the employment gap equations, 
the estimated effect of regulation increases slightly, remaining significant at the 1% level. The estimated 











































Table 3.B.1 Determinants of the gender employment gap 





Product market regulation 1.09*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 1.06*** 1.14*** 0.94*** 0.97*** 1.26***
[7.01] [4.42] [4.03] [3.88] [7.60] [4.90] [4.66] [4.82]
Share of services in GDP -12.73*** -15.30*** -25.72*** -13.50*** -14.56*** -24.96***
[3.41] [3.76] [4.17] [3.34] [3.62] [4.12]
Union density 0.06** 0.08*** -0.02 0.06** 0.08** -0.03
[2.23] [2.69] [0.27] [2.14] [2.55] [0.44]
EPL index -0.01 0.31 -0.03 0.41
[0.02] [0.69] [0.09] [0.92]
High corporatism dummy -0.61 0.94 -0.73* 1.28*
[1.39] [1.19] [1.67] [1.72]
Tax wedge (couples) -0.04* 0.06 -0.04* 0.07
[1.7] [0.94] [1.89] [1.03]
Average benefit replacement rate -0.00 0.10** 0.00 0.11***
[0.12] [2.38] [0.18] [2.61]




Tax incentives to work part-time 0.10 0.10
[1.47] [1.47]
Family cash benefits -0.18** -0.14*
[2.03] [1.67]
Observations 602 436 414 244 573 414 414 244













Including the interaction between collective 
bargaining coverage and total employment rate
Total employment rate (in percent)
Gender gap in labour participation rates 
(in percent)
Interaction between collective bargaining 












Relative marginal tax rate
on the second earner
 
Notes: In the first stage the dependent variable is the gender employment gap (in percentages) in the working-age population and 
specifications include variables indicated in the top panel plus country dummies, time dummies and country-specific time trends. In 
the second stage, the residual from the first stage is regressed on variables in the bottom panel plus country dummies, time dummies 
and country-specific time trends. Product market regulation theoretically varies between 0 and 6 from the least to the most regulated. 
Observations and R-squared statistics at the bottom of each panel refer to either the first stage (top panel) or the second stage 
(bottom panel). First-stage estimates are based on the largest possible sample including the same countries, which implies that: a) 
observations are not the same in the two stages; and b) several second-stage estimates share the same first stage. In interactions, 
variables are defined as  deviations from the sample  mean,  to preserve comparability of coefficients of non-interacted variables. 
Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.B.2 The effect of competition and regulation on industry-level gender employment gaps 
Prime-age workers, 1992-2002  
Second stage estimates
Profitability 30.99*** 31.81*** 19.64** 22.82*** 16.84*
[3.05] [2.73] [2.47] [2.84] [1.837]
Product market regulation 2.10*** 1.89** 3.16***
[2.73] [2.11] [3.71]
Basic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Extended controls no  yes no  no  yes yes yes yes
Country by year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry by year dummies no yes no  no  yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,828 1,670 1,053 1,166 998 1,089 921 1,012
R-squared (second-stage) 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13
2.54 3.25 -0.60 .. 5.37 .. 43.63 ..
[0.11] [2.57] [0.03] [0.21] [1.61]
Largest sample Reduced sample





Notes: In the first stage, the dependent variable is the gender wage and salary employment gap (in percentages) in the population aged between 25 and 54 years. In the second stage, 
the residual from the first stage is regressed on variables presented in the table plus country dummies, time dummies and country-specific time trends. Profitability is defined as the ratio 
of output to intermediate input, labour and capital costs, and varies between .94 and 1.79 in the sample. Product market regulation varies between 0 and 6 from the least to the most 
regulated. Basic controls are the logarithm of total employment in the industry and its interaction with the average coverage of collective agreements. Extended controls include: the 
share of employees aged between 45 and 54 years, the share of employees with more than upper secondary education, the share of part-time employees and the share of employees 
working in firms with 10 employees or less. Observations and R-squared statistics refer to the second stage. The largest sample is an unbalanced sample including 8 manufacturing 
and 8 non-manufacturing industries in Norway and pre-enlargement EU countries, excluding Greece, Luxembourg  and Sweden,  from 1992 to 2002. The reduced sample is an 
unbalanced sample including 8 manufacturing and 3 non-manufacturing industries in the same countries from 1994 to 2002, except for Austria, Finland and Norway, where the sample 
is further restricted to 1995-2002. The last line of the table reports for each column, the coefficient difference between manufacturing and non-manufacturing for variants of the same 
specifications in which the coefficient of profitability is allowed to vary across groups of industries. This test is not available for specifications with regulatory indicators since the latter are 
set equal to an arbitrary constant in manufacturing. Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Interpretation: The table shows that a 1 point fall in anti-competitive regulation (almost corresponding to the difference between the OECD average and the least regulated country in 
2002) would decrease the employment gap by between 0.9 and 1.9 percentage points. Similarly, a 0.04 increase in profitability (corresponding to the average increase in profitability 
between 1992 and 2002 in the sample) would increase the gender employment gap by between 0.7 and 1.3 percentage points. 










































Table 3.B.3 Ratification of anti-discrimination conventions and the gender employment gap 
Determinants of the gender employment gap (in percentage), working-age population 
Second stage estimates
Anti-discrimination conventions 
(qualitative index) -1.15*** -1.11*** -1.17*** -1.19***
[6.80] [6.74] [6.93] [6.96]
Anti-discrimination conventions 
(quantitative index) -0.18* -0.16* -0.18** -0.20** -0.41* -0.44** -0.44*
[1.96] [1.77] [2.00] [2.12] [1.92] [2.06] [1.84]
Work ban conventions 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 0.91*** 0.51*** 0.58*** 0.58***
[6.81] [6.83] [6.66] [6.96] [7.04] [6.89] [2.59] [2.89] [2.61]
Log import penetration -0.89** -0.80* -0.77* -0.71* -2.88*** -2.59*** -2.46***
[2.17] [1.93] [1.84] [1.66] [4.39] [3.94] [3.46]
Collective bargaining conventions 0.17 0.14
[0.88] [0.73]
Product market regulation 0.83*** 0.86*** 0.86***
[4.34] [4.59] [4.09]
Share of services in GDP -9.66*** -11.19*** -13.00***
[2.66] [3.04] [3.23]




High corporatism dummy -0.43
[1.08]
Tax wedge (couples) -0.02
[0.83]
Average benefit replacement rate -0.01
[0.34]
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ttime dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-specific time trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 971 971 953 953 971 971 953 953 436 436 414
R-squared 0.046 0.093 0.100 0.101 0.005 0.053 0.058 0.059 0.400 0.414 0.425
Period 1975-2003
Qualitative index
Period 1960-2003 Period 1960-2003
Quantitative index
 
Note: See Table 3.B.1. Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.B.4 Determinants of the logarithm of the gender wage gap 
Meta-analysis of the unexplained wage gap residual, 1975-2001 
Second stage estimates
Product market regulation 0.059** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.056** 0.032* 0.038** 0.041** 0.034*
[2.52] [2.79] [2.85] [2.11] [1.82] [2.18] [2.27] [1.70]
EPL index -0.072* -0.070* -0.076* -0.064** -0.063** -0.060*
[1.78] [1.74] [1.81] [2.15] [2.10] [1.93]
Log gender employment gap -0.233 -0.345 -0.199 -0.452
[0.67] [0.72] [0.78] [1.25]
Average benefit replacement 
rate -0.001 0
[0.44] [0.07]
High corporatism dummy 0.014 0.025
[0.28] [0.67]
Tax wedge (couples) 0.001 0.002
[0.22] [0.65]
Union density 0 0
[0.11] [0.10]
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-specific time trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 188 188 188 180 185 185 185 177
R-squared 0.735 0.742 0.743 0.739 0.79 0.798 0.799 0.782
Excluding outliers No control for outliers
 
Notes: In the first stage the dependent variable is the unexplained residual of gender wage gap obtained in various studies through 
regression-based decompositions and co-variates includes country-year fixed effects plus meta-variables capturing regression and 
decomposition methods, selection criteria and specifications (in first-stage regressions, probability weights equal to the inverse of the 
number of estimates per country and year provided by each study are assigned to each observation). In the second stage, the 
country-year fixed effects from the first stage are regressed on the variables in the bottom panel plus country dummies, time dummies 
and country-specific time trends (observations are weighted by the inverse of their first-stage variances). Product market regulation 
theoretically varies between 0 and 6 from the least to the most regulated. Observations and R-squared statistics refer to the second 
stage. 3 outliers  have been identified applying  the asymptotic Welsch-Kuh distance cut-off and the covariance  ratio cut-off to a 
regression of the second-stage dependent variable on a linear trend. Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 











































Table 3.B.5 Ratification of anti-discrimination conventions and the gender wage gap 
Meta-analysis of the unexplained wage gap residual, 1975-2001 
Second stage estimates
Anti-discrimination conventions 
(quantitative index) -0.071** -0.065** -0.070** -0.050** -0.044* -0.047*
[2.19] [2.02] [2.13] [2.05] [1.82] [1.94]
Work ban conventions 0.014 0.010
[0.54] [0.52]
Product market regulation 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.037** 0.042** 0.043**
[2.81] [3.03] [2.94] [2.10] [2.39] [2.36]
EPL index -0.063 -0.062 -0.057* -0.056*
[1.57] [1.53] [1.94] [1.88]
Log gender employment gap -0.276 -0.228
[0.78] [0.87]
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-specific time trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 188 188 188 185 185 185
R-squared 0.745 0.75 0.753 0.797 0.803 0.805
No control for outliers Excluding outliers
 
Note: See Table 3.B.4. Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 














































Figure 3.C.1 Average gender wage gap and employment rate gap for prime age, by education, 2001 
Percentages 
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Figure 3.C.3 Wage dispersion and the average gender wage gap 
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a) For earnings dispersion, data refer to 2004 for Australia, 2002 for France, Spain and Switzerland, 2000 for Ireland, 1996 for Italy 
and 1999 for Korea. 
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